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The record on appeal is the complete record of the 
case in the Court below consisting of original papers 
and transcripts of all proceedings of the Court, stipu-
lations made and documents received. 
The record shows the following facts: 
(1) That appellant acquired title to said land in 
1915, and since that time has been and has remained and 
still remains in actual occupancy of said land (through 
his agents) as well as in constructive possession thereof. 
Respondents have never occupied said land or any part 
thereof., (Para. III App. Amended Answer to Complaint; 
Para. 5 p. 6 App. Amended Cross-Complaint Replacing 
his Third Amended Cross-Complaint; App. Answer to 
Res. affinnative allegation contained in Res. Answer 
to App. Amended Answer, Tr. of testimony of Clarence 
I. Johnson). 
Respondents commenced this action on September 
22, 1948. (R. 1) It is a blanket action seeking to quiet 
title claimed by respondents to numerous and separate 
parcels of land against more than 50 defendants named, 
including appellant, as to the said land to which this 
appeal relates (Res. Complaint). The case was adjudi-
cated and disposed of as to all other defendants on 
March 1, 1950, when the court made its findings and 
decree with respect to all other defendants (R. 108-19) 
but held and decreed that "this decree shall in no man-
ner affect the interest of CULBERT L. OLSON in and 
to the North half of the Southwest quarter of Section 
34, in Tp. 1 South of Range 1 East of the Uintah Special 
1neridian ( 80 acres here involved) and this court re-
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tains jurisdiction over the said CULBERT L. OLSON 
and the said land herein last described to n1ake such 
further order, judg1nents and decrees as may determine 
the respective rights of the plaintiffs herein and the 
said CULBERT L. OLSON defendant." (Findings and 
decree made by Judge TUCI(ETT March 1,1950. R. 119) 
Appellant was not served and knew nothing of the 
existence of this action until September 16, 1949, when 
from the Clerk of said District Court, he received, by 
registered mail, copies of the Summons and Complaint 
at his office, 639 South Spring Street, (910 Stock Ex-
change Bldg.), Los Angeles, California. 
Appellant duly served and filed his original answer 
admitting that he clain1ed title to said land adverse to 
plaintiffs, denied that the right, title and interest claimed 
by him is without merit, prayed that the same be deter-
mined and for judgment quieting his title thereto against 
the claims of respondents. (R. 84-7) Thereafter, April18, 
1950, appellant served and filed an Amended Answer, 
alleging title in himself as sole owner in fee simple of 
said land; that he is in ·possession and entitled to the 
possession thereof and praying that his title be quieted 
against the claims of plaintiffs. (R. 201-3) 
Upon filing his original Answer, appellant communi-
cated with respondent's attorney GEORGE B. STAN-
LEY, Heber, Utah, requesting information regarding 
the basis of respondent's claim to said land, and asked 
for his abstract of title thereto. 
Quite some time thereafter, Mr. STANLEY (a 
licensed abstractor), answered this request by telephone 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
saving he would send appellant his abstract of title. This 
Mr. STANLEY finally djd, but not until the latter part 
of December 1949, when on Dece1nber 19, 1949, appel-
lant received from him at appellant's said Los Angeles 
address, the abstract of title, which is a part of the 
record, (Ex. A) and accompanied the same with the fol-
lowing letter (also a part of the record) (R. 326): 
GEORGE B. STANLEY 
Attorney at Law 
Registered Abstractor 
Phone 2-Heber, Utah 
December 14, 1949 
1\{r. Culbert L. Olson 
Attorney at Law 
639 South Spring Street 
Los Angeles, California 
Dear Mr. Olson: 
"Pursuant to my telephone. conversation, I 
enclose herewith abstract of title No. 790, pre-
pared by Stanley Title Company, last certificate 
dated November 23rd, 1949, at 5:00 o'clock P.J\L 
covering the North half of the Southwest quarter 
of Section 34, in Township 1 South of Range 1 
East of the Uintah Special :Meridian. 
"You will note at page 34 that Uintah County 
8old this property on September 30th, 1940, and 
that the contract was fully paid and deed issued 
on September 22nd, 1943, as shown at page 37 of 
the abstract. 
••The ruling case is that of Bozievich v. 
Schlecta, 166 P. 2d 239, in that case, the Auditor's 
Tax Deed was stipulated by the parties to be 
absolutely void. In spite of that fact, when the 
county put into possession a tenant under its 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
deed, the statute began to run, and seven years 
thereafter, the purchaser under the contract was 
held to be the legal owner. 
"I also enclose a notice of continuance of 
trial, which i~ now set for January lOth, 1950. 
All of the evidence is in and if you desire to dis-
claim, kindly let me know immediately. 
"I would appreciate an early return of the 
abstract of title. 
Yours very truly, 
GEORGE B. STANLEY" 
Upon a complete examination of said abstract of 
title, after appellant had served and filed (January 9, 
1950 R. 98-101) an original Cross-complaint to quiet 
his title to said land against respondents (and other::-; 
with respect to land in an adjoining county, mistakenly 
included) appellant discovered the mention of a judg-
ment entered by said court on November 13, 1946, in a 
case (Civil No. 2388) wherein J. PARRY BOWEN was 
named as plaintiff and appellant was named as defend-
ant, quieting title to said land in said plaintiff (Abstract 
of Title p. 51). 
Thereupon (~larch 27, 1950), appellant served and 
filed his First Amended Cross-complaint attacking said 
judgment as being void, showing that appellant had not 
been legally served with Summons and has no knowl-
edge of the existence of said action or that plaintiff 
claimed any interest in said land until after he was per-
sonally served with Summons and Complaint in the 
present action, and alleging that the Court had no juris-
diction to enter said judgment against appellant. (R. 192-
6) 
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At the satne ti1ne, appellant went to Y ernal, the 
county seat of said county, from his home in Los Angele:;~ 
and examined the record ·in said Civil Action No. 2388. 
While so doing and while there in the office of the County 
Clerk, appellant 1net and· had a conversation with said 
GEORGE B. STANLEY, attorney for respondents, 
about said action and the invalidity of a default judg-
ment entered therein against appellant. Following ar(:' 
excerpts from the transcript of the record of proceedings 
before the Court on April 3, 1950, n1ade in connection 
with fixing a date for the trial of this case, with refer-
ence to said conversation and including stipulations with 
appellant then made by respondents: (R. 188) 
"1\fR. OLSON: Well, I will tell you, Mr. 
Stanley, I will cooperate in having the trial just 
as early as I can be prepared. If it can be tried 
at an earlier date than May 8th and I can get 
prepared, I will do it. And I can say to you, if 
you change your pleadings and admit paragraphs 
4 and 5 of 1ny Cross-complaint, that will facilitat(:' 
the trial of the case, and reduce it to what I under-
stood you to say; that is, that you 1nade no claim 
under the tax deed and 1nade no claim under the 
judgment that was referred to in those para-
graphs, except the color of title. 
"MR. STANLEY: I did tell you that we 
would not rely on the tax deed, the validity of tlw 
tax title, only that the Auditor's Tax Deed did 
give the county color of title. And on the other 
matter I may have gone a little too far in n1aking 
the statement. Of course, I don't think that l 
unqualifiedly said we \Vould not rely on the for-
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mer action, I said o·ur position is we are not taking 
that too seriously, I don't think 'tre will press it. 
"1\IR. OLSON: Do you recall looking at the 
files in this action with me in the Clerk's office! 
""MR. STANLEY: Ye.s, I did. 
•• .MR. OLSOK: And do you recall saytng 
that the judgment was no good? 
'•:MR. STAKLEY: That I didn't think it was 
worth much. 
":MR. OLSON: Well, I can say to you, if 
the issues are resolved into the question of ad-
verse possession and not on any claim of validity 
of title under the tax deed, then I think we can 
shorten it here. I will hasten insofar as I can get 
here, get in touch with 1\fr. Johnson wherever he 
is, I will phone Mr. Gatrell to find out if he can 
get in a position to come. But, I can't be ready 
before ~Iay 8th under your denials of my Cross-
complaint, allegations as to the tax deed and as 
to the judgment, especially the former. 
"1\ffi. STANLEY: Well, I will say this, as 
far as the proposition of the tax deed is con-
cerned, we will admit that it is not a valid tax 
deed, that the proceedings in the matter are in-
valid because no auditor's affidavit has been filed 
in the assessment rolls as required by law. 
":MR. OLSON: Will you admit that the 
taxes were illegally assessed in 1933 f 
"1\fR. STANLEY: No. 
"MR. OLSON: And that the sale was il-
legal? 
"MR. STANLEY: No. We think that is 
inunaterial. The auditor's tax deed did give color 
of title whether that was illegal or not. 
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"l:lR. OLSON: In other words, you are will-
ing to admit that the tax deed and the proceed-
ings leading ttp to it were invalid and your only 
claim is color of title under the tax deed; is that 
it? 
•'MR. STANLEY: That's right. 
"~IR. OLSON: Well, now you don't say so 
in your Answer. 
"MR. STANLEY: We don't say we do or we 
don't. 
"~IR. OLSON: Well, will you stipulate to 
that? 
•'MR. STANLEY: We will be willing to 
stipulate to that. 
•'THE COURT: Let me interrupt. Now your 
stipulation is what~ 
":MR. STANLEY: The stipulation is to this 
effect, Your Honor. That the tax deed to the 
county, the auditor's tax deed to the county might 
as well give you the book and page on it. The 
Auditor's Tax Deed from F. L. Noal, as County 
Clerk and ex officio County Auditor of Uintah 
County, to Uintah County, recorded in Book 31 
of Deeds at Pages 426 and 427, as Entry No. 
10146, of the Records of Uintah County, Utah, is 
invalid to convey title to the county for the rea-
son that the auditor's affidavit required by law 
was not attached to the assessmen.t roll." 
Respondents had filed an Answer to appellant's 
First Amended Cross-complaint (Trans. of Proceedings 
~fay 3, 1950), in which respondents had alleged (Para. 
III) that they claimed some right, title and interest, lien, 
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encmnbrance and estate 1n the land described in ap-
pellant's First Atnended Cross-complaint adYerse. to 
the right, title and interest of appellant, and alleged that 
respondents are the owners and lessee in possession and 
entitled to the possession of the land involved. Respond-
ents (Para. Y) amnit the action and the entry of the 
decree n1entioned in appellant's Cross-complaint (Para~ 
V) and denied all of the other allegations; and respond-
ents further alleged (Para. VIII) that "they and their 
predecessors in title have been in the open, notorious, un-
interrupted, adverse, continuous, quiet and peaceful pos-
session" of the land in question "under color of title 
and claim of right ... for a period of more than seven 
years prior to the commencement of this action," etc. 
(R. 197-9) 
Respondents further alleged (Para. IX) in their 
said Answer that appellant had not been seized nor pos-
sessed of said land "within seven years before the com-
mencement of this action" and that appellant is "barred 
by the provisions of Section 104-2-5 Civil Code Anno-
tated, 1943, as amended by Chapter 18, Laws of Utah, 
1943 ; and by the provisions of Section 104-2-6, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1943, as amended by Chapter 20, Laws of 
Utah, 1943." 
Appellant then filed his Second, (209-15) and im-
mediately thereafter, his Third Amended Cross-com-
plaint, (216-23) attacking said judgment with more spe-
cific allegations as to its invalidity and the reasons 
therefor than was given in his First and Second Amend-
ed Cross-c01nplaint, showing that service of Summons 
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in said action did not comply with Sections 104-5-12, 104-
5-13, 104-5-15, Utah Code Annotated 1943 and alleging: 
"That the affidavit for publication of Sum-
mons in said action was not made in good faith, 
is insufficient and wilfully false; that it fails to 
show due or any diligence to ascertain the resi-
dences of defendant therein, and said affidavit 
is false in that it states that personal service on 
this defendant could not be had; that said affi-
davit is false in that it states that the affiant, for 
the purpose of finding said defendant, has made 
diligent search and inquiry in the State of Utah, 
and 'has checked the records in both' to determine 
the last address of the defendant, and finds that 
his last address was: 'Culbert L. Olson - Un-
known,' whereas, the place of residence and known 
address of this defendant and cross-complainant 
was, at and long prior to the date of said affidavit, 
and still is, recorded in the offices of the County 
assessor and County Treasurer of Uintah County, 
Utah, and is the same address at which defend-
ant was personally served with Summons in the 
present action; that this defendant and cross-
complainant's place of residence in the State of 
California was at and long prior to the date of 
said affidavit, and ever since that date, has been 
well known in the State of Utah and in Uintah 
County by citizens and public officials of said 
State and County; and should have been well 
known to the affiant in said affidavit; that a 
mere casual inquiry by said affiant wo,uld have in-
formed him of this defe~dant and cross-complain-
ant's exact street address of his business office, 
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639 South Spring Street, in the City of Lo~ 
Angeles, California, which is and has been his well 
known and published business office address for 
n1ore than twenty (20) years last past. 
"That said void judgment does not vest in 
J. PARRY BO,YEX, or any persons claiming 
under him any right, title or interest in or to said 
land; that said void judgment is a cloud on cross-
complainant's title, and cross-complainant is en-
titled to have the srune vacated and adjudged null 
and void. 
"Cross-complainant alleges further that he 
never received actual notice of the filing of said 
action or of any proceedings therein or connected 
therewith, or that said J. PARRY BOWEN or 
any of said cross-defendants claimed any interest 
in said land until after this present action was 
commenced and cross-complainant received serv-
ice of Summons and a copy of cross-defendant's 
Complaint herein, which was mailed to him at 
his said address in Los Angeles, California;" 
and prayed that said judgment be vacated and adjudged 
null and void. (See 2nd and 3rd Amended Cross-conl-
plaints). 
To this Third Amended Cross-complaint respond-
ents answered, (R. 226-8) and admitted the entry of 
said default judgment, and denying its invalidity, al-
leged that said judgment is res adjudicata, claimed title 
to the land in dispute by adverse possession and al-
leged that appellant's claim thereto is barred by Stat-
utes of Limitations (since held invalid by this Court), 
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and by the Provisions of Rule 60 (b), Utah Rules of· Pro-
cedure, 1950, and by laches. (Res. Ans. to 3rd Amended 
Cross-complaint). 
The case came on for trial before Judge Nelson on 
May 1st, 1950, at which time respondents filed their said 
Answer to appellant's Third Amended Cross-complaint, 
after a motion was made by respondents to strike cer-
tain portions thereof. (R. 135) This motion to strike 
was argued and submitted and taken under advisement 
by the Court until the next day, :\lay 2nd, when it was 
withdrawn by respondents without any ruling thereon. 
(Trans. of Proceedings, R. 143) Then, on May 2, 1950, 
· respondents, after introducing in evidence the judgment 
roll in said default judgment action (Civil No. 2388) 
orally made a motion for summary judgment on the fol-
lowing grounds: (R. 149) 
"First, that the action on the judgment now 
before the Court is barred by the provisions of 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
second, that action is barred by the laches of the 
defendant CULBERT L. OLSON, and the cross-
complainant, on the basis of the n1atters appear-
ing on the record before the Court; and, third~ 
that this action is barred for the reason that his 
attack in this action is a collateral attack upon 
a judgment of this Court, valid upon its face. 
We would like to proceed with argument in con-
nection with our motion, Your Honor." 
This motion was then argued. The court took the 
Inotion under advisement until Tuesday, May 9, 1950, 
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and heard the testiinony of CLARENCE I. JOHNSON, 
(R. 154-180) a witness for appellant brought fr01n Cali-
fornia on the issue of adverse possession, showing ac-
tual possession of said land by appellant's agent and li-
eensee. (Trans. of Proceedings, ~fay 2, 1950). 
Said abstract of title and respondent's admissions 
and stipulation in open Court show that appellant is 
record owner of said land unless the judgment in Civil 
Action No. 2388 is a valid judgment. 
On May 9, 1950, before the court ruled on said motion 
for summary judgment, appellant made the following 
offer of proof of the allegations of his Third amended 
Cross-Complaint: (R. 182-185) 
"I offer to prove the judgment in said action 
of J. PARRY BOWEN versus CULBERT L. 
OLSON, No. 2388, which my Cross-complaint in 
this action attacks, is null and void, and ask to 
have it vacated and adjudged null and void, and 
all of the files in said action, including the affi-
davit of publication of Summons, if that affidavit 
is not technically a part of the judgment role. 
"I offer to prove that the statement in said 
affidavit of publication of Summons in said ae-
tion, that personal service of Summons in said 
action could not be had, was wilfully false and 
fraudulent. 
"I offer to prove that the statement made in 
said affidavit for publication of Summons, that 
'affiant, for the purpose of finding said defend-
ant, has made diligent search and inquiry in the 
State of Utah, and has checked the records of 
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both to determine the last address of the defend-
ant, and finds that his l~st address was :"Culbert , 
L. Olson-Unknown"' besides being obscure as 
to its intended meaning was wilfully false and 
fraudulent. 
"I offer to pro:ve that said affidavit, and the 
said false and fraudulent statement therein, were 
made for the purpose of avoiding personal service 
of Summons in said action, as provided by law, 
and prevented cross-complainant, defendant in 
said action, from knowing that it existed. I offer 
to prove that cross-complainant, defendant in said 
action, was a resident of California, and that the 
means of ascertaining his place of residence and 
post office address in that State was well known 
in Uintah County and in the State of Utah, and 
in the offices of said County and State, when 
said affidavit was made, and long prior thereto, 
and that his post office address in California 
necessarily became known to affiant in said action 
in the preparation of his Complaint herein. I 
offer to prove the following facts, which plaintiff 
and cross-defendants in this action have agreed 
to stipulate on, without the necessity of bringing 
in the records thereof, that the assessment rolls 
in the offices of the County Treasurer and of the 
County Assessor of Uintah County, Utah, for 
each and every year since 1929, until and includ-
ing the year 1938 show that the land described in 
the Complaint and judginent of the Court in said 
action was assessed to: 'Culbert L. Olson, 910 
Stock Exchange Building, Los Angeles, Cali-
fornia.' That said address-910 Stock Exchange 
Building, Los Angeles, California, is also 639 
South Spring Street, the street number of said 
Stock Exchange Building - Los Angeles, Cali-
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fornia, and that both addresses in said City refer 
to one and the same place. That if Sununons 
and Complaint in said action had been mailed 
to said defendant at 910 Stock Exchange Building, 
Los Angeles, California, they should have reached 
said defendant at said address in due course of 
the mail. That the Clerk of said court did not de-
posit a copy of the Summons and Complaint or 
either of them in said action, addressed to said 
defendant at said address in Los Angeles, Cali-
fornia; that no copy of Summons and Complaint 
or either of them in said action, addressed to said 
defendant at said address in Los Angeles, Cali-
fornia, was deposited in the post office directed 
to the said defendant at his place of residence or 
at any place, or at all; that said assessment rolls 
also show that said land was not assessed for the 
years 1939, 1940, 1941 and 1942; that the entry on 
said assessment roll with reference to said land 
for the year 1942 reads as follows: Uintah County, 
and under the name Olson. 
"I offer to prove that the post office address 
of cross-complainant herein, defendant in said Ac-
tion No. 2388, has been his post office address 
as a resident of Los Angeles, California, since 
the year 1929, and prior thereto; that his name 
was printed in the telephone and city directories 
of said city during all of said years. 
"I offer to prove that cross-complainant since 
1901 has been and still is a member of the Bar of 
the State of Utah; that he is also a member of the 
Bar of the State of California, and has been since 
prior to 1923, and his said address has been listed 
in the published legal directories of California 
lawyers ever since 1929 and prior thereto. 
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"I offer to prove that cross-complainant was 
a member of the Utah State Senate from 1916 to 
1920 inclusive, was a member of the California 
State Senate from 1934 to 1938 inclusive, and was 
Governor of California from 1938 to January 
1943, which fact was widely publicized in the daily 
and weekly newspapers of Utah, including papers 
having wide distribution in Uintah County. 
"I offer to prove that neither plaintiffs in said 
action of 1946, and cross-defendants in the present 
action, nor the person, or any of the persons, un-
der whom he may claim color of title, never has 
occupied and has never been in possession of the 
land in controversy, and all of the allegations 
contained in my cross-complaint. 
"I offer to prove that until April 3, 1950, 
at least, I was mislead by counsel for plaintiffs 
and cross-defendants in believing that they con-
ceded that said 1946 judgment is void; that they 
would not rely upon said judgment and would 
not resist my Cross-complaint to have the judg-
ment vacated, and that misleading began with 
the fact that they sued the same parties, sued me 
in this action to quiet their title, and by the fact 
that they set up in their Answer to my Second 
Amended Cross-complaint the claim of title by 
adverse possession. I call attention to the stipu-
lation made." 
To which counsel for respondents replied as follows: 
(R. 185) 
"MR. STANLEY: Even granting that all of 
the proof offered by Mr. --------, all of the purported 
proof which Mr. Olson says he will offer, if he 
is permitted to offer proof regarding the invalid-
ity of the judgment before the court, even though 
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all that is granted and allowed in this case, he 
would still be barred by the provisions of Rule 
60(b) and he would still be barred by laches in not 
asserting his claim for over three years after 
the judg1nent had been entered." 
Thereupon the court ruled as follows: (R. 186) 
"THE COURT: The motion of the plain-
tiffs for judgment, that the court has had under 
advisement, will be denied. The court is of the 
opinion, however, as the record now stands, that 
by virtue of the decree entered in No. 2388 Civil, 
which has been introduced in evidence in this mat-
ter, that the matter in this action is res judicata 
by virtue of that decree. The court is further of 
the opinion, as the record now stands, that defend-
ant CULBERT L. OLSON'S Cross-complaint is a 
collateral attack." 
Appellant then asked leave to further plead and was 
granted 10 days in which to do so. (Trans. of Proceed-
ings May 9, 1950, R. 186-7) 
Appellant then duly served and filed his Cross-com-
plaint "Amending and Replacing his Third Amended 
Cross-complaint," repeating his charge that said judg-
ment is void; that it was obtained illegally and by fraud 
upon the Court and upon appellant and still more speci-
fically and extensively setting forth the facts constitu-
ting the fraud perpetrated in obtaining said judgment. 
(R. 230-6) 
Following are the allegations of said Cross-com-
plaint: 
''1. That on November 13, 1946, in an action, 
Civil No. 2388, brought by cross-defendant J. 
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PARRY BOWEN, against this cross-complainant, 
a Default Judgment was entered in this court ad-
judging that said cross-defendant J. PARRY 
BOWEN was the owner of: 
The North half ( ¥2 ) of the Southwest Quar-
ter (:14) of Section 34, Township 1, South, 
Range 1 East of the Uintah Special Meridian, 
Uintah County, Utah. 
as claimed in his Complaint in said action; that 
said description describes the same identicall8lld 
to which said J. PARRY BOWEN and said other 
cross-defendants seek to quiet title in themselves 
in this present action. 
"2. That the claims in this present action, 
Civil No. 2617, of cross-defendant J. PARRY 
BOWEN, KEITH J. BOWEN, MORLEY DEAN, 
IRENE M. DEAN, his wife, J. A. CHENEY, J. 
R. ROBERTSON and GUY T. WOODWORTH to 
title and ownership interests in said land, 8lld 
the claim made in this present action by cross-
defendant, PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COM-
PANY, a corporation, to rights as lessee of min-
eral rights in said land, are all made under 8lld 
by virtue of said Default Judgment against this 
cross-complainant entered in said action, Civil No. 
2388. 
"3. Cross-complainant alleges that said De-
fault Judgment entered against him in said action, 
Civil No. 2388 is void, and cross-complain8llt 
claims the right to have the same vacated as null 
and void because and by reason of the following 
facts: 
" (a). That Summons in said action was not 
served on this cross-complainant, the defendant 
in said action, as required by law. 
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··(b). That the affidavit for the Order signed 
bv the Clerk of said court for service of Sumrnons 
iii said action by publication, was insufficient in 
that it did not state probatory or evidenciary facts 
from which a judge or Clerk of said court could . 
determine that the place of residence of the de-
fendant was unk11own; that said affidavit did not 
justify the issuance of said order by the Clerk 
without his forthwith depositing a copy of the 
Sununons and Complaint in the post office di-
rected to the defendant at his place of residence: 
that said affidavit does not state that the place of 
residence of the defendant was unknown to the 
plaintiff or to his attorney who made said affi-
davit; that said affidavit does not contain pro-
bative or evidenciary facts from which it could 
be determined by a Judge or Clerk of said Court 
that any effort was made by plaintiff or the affi-
ant in said affidavit to ascertain the place of resi-
dence of the defendant, as a non-resident of the 
State of Utah; that said affidavit does not contain 
probative or evidenciary facts from which it could 
be determined by a Judge or Clerk of said Court 
what, if any diligence was used by said affiant in 
his alleged 'diligent search and inquiry in the 
State of Utah for the purpose of finding the de-
fendant,' or in what record or where the affiant 
found, as stated in his said affidavit, that the de-
fendant's last known address was : 
'Culbert L. Olsen -Unknown.' 
"(c). That said affidavit is wilfully false 
and misleading and fraudulent in that it states 
that: 
"Personal service thereon ( Surnmons) cannot 
be had and •that affiant, for the purpose of find-
ing said defendant has made diligent search and 
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inquiry in the State of U tab, and has checked 
the records of both to determine the last address 
of the defendant, and finds that his last address 
was: 
"Culbert L. Olsen- Unknown."' 
"(d). That nowhere did the affiant in said 
affidavit for publication of Summons find in the 
records of the State of Utah or the County of 
Uintah, that the last address of cross-complaint 
was 'Culbert L. Olsen-Unknown.' 
" (e). That the Complaint, a Summons with 
no return thereon, said affidavit for publication 
of Summons, and the Order issued by the Clerk 
of the Court for the publication of Summons, in 
said action, in a weekly newspaper published in 
Uintah County, were all filed and issued on the 
same day, September 11, 1946. 
"That said Order was signed by the Clerk as 
prepared and directed by plaintiff's attorney, 
without any judicial consideration by the Clerk 
of said Court; that the Clerk of said Court did 
not deposit a copy of the Summons and Complaint 
or either of them in the post office directed to the 
defendant at his place of residence or at any place, 
or at all. 
"' (f). That on November 12, 1946, a Proof 
of Publication of said Summons without the ad-
dress of plaintiff's attorney, and not made by the 
proper person designated by Statute to make such 
proof, was filed with a Precipe to enter Default 
of defendant, and at the same time the defendant's 
Default was entered by the Clerk of said Court. 
"(g). That at the time said action was pre-
pared and filed, the plaintiff and his attorney 
who made said affidavit, and the Clerk of said 
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Court had eonvenient means of knowledge of the 
place of residence and exact post office addresR 
of the defendant, CULBERT L. OLSON; that the 
assessn1ent rollt:' in the offices of the County As-
sessor and County Treasurer of Uintah County, 
next door to the office of said Clerk, showed plain-
ly, with reference to the record title and assess-
ment of and payment of taxes on said land, the 
the name and exact post office address of said de-
fendant in the City of Los Angeles, California; 
that said assessment rolls for each and every year 
since 1929 until and including the year 1938, then 
showed as they now show, that said land was as-
sessed to CULBERT L. OLSON, 910 Stock Ex-
change Building, Los Angeles, California, and 
that said land was not assessed for the years 1939, 
1940, 1941, and 1942. 
"(h). That said post office address of thi~ 
cross-complainant, defendant in said action, Civil 
No. 2388, has been his post office address as a 
resident of Los Angeles, California, since the year 
1929, and prior thereto; that his name and said 
post office address were printed and published 
in the telephone and city directories of said city 
and in the published list of attorneys circulated 
and distributed to la-vvyers and public officials 
at the time of the commencement of said action, 
and prior thereto; that cross-complainant, since 
1901, has been and still is a member of the Bar 
of the State of Utah, and since 1923, or prior 
thereto, has been a member of the Bar of the State 
of California; that cross-complainant was a mem-
ber of the Utah State Senate from January 1917, 
to January, 1921, and was a member of the Cali-
fornia State Senate from January, 1935, to J anu-
ary, 1939; that in 1948 cross-complainant was 
elected Governor of California and served in that 
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office from January, 1939, until January, 1943, 
which fact was widely publicized in the daily 
and weekly newspapers of Utah, including daily 
newspapers of wide distribution in Uintah 
County, and was known to the affiant in said affi-
davit; that cross-complainant was well known in 
the State of Utah and among citizens of Uintah 
County; that independent of the records of said 
County, any good faith inquiry would have dis-
closed cross-complainant's place of residence and 
post office address to any person seeking service 
of Summons on him in said action. 
" ( i). That said action was brought to quiet 
title to said land in cross-defendant J. PARRY 
BOWEN, against this cross-complainant; and 
cross-complainant alleges that the plaintiff in said 
action and the affiant in said affidavit, his attor-
ney, in ascertaining their reasons for filing said 
action, necessarily became acquainted with facts 
leading to information as to the place of residence 
and post office address of cross-complainant, de-
fendant in said action. 
"(j). That cross-complainant alleges that 
said Order for publication of Summons was se-
cured by said insufficient, false and fraudulent 
affidavit for the purpose of preventing cross-
complainant from knowing the existence of said 
action, and from appearing therein, and defending 
his title to said land. 
"4. Cross-complainant further alleges that 
he never received any notice of any kind and did 
not know of the filing of said action, or of any 
proceedings therein or connected therewith, or 
that said judgment had been entered, or that said 
action ever existed, until long after he was served 
by mail at his said Los Angeles, California, ad-
dress, with copies of Summons and Complaint in 
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this present action by J. PARRY BOWEN et al, 
against this cross-complainant, Civil No. 2617, on 
September 16, 1949; that cross-complainant at-
tacked the validity of said Judgment immediately 
upon learning that plaintiffs in the present action 
were relying on said Judgment in support of their 
claims made in this present action of ownership 
and interests in said land as against this cross-
complainant, after being led by counsel for cross-
defendants to believe that they did not intend to 
rely on the validity of said Judgment and would 
not oppose the vacation of said Judgment as being 
invalid. 
"5. That this cross-complainant, as defend-
ant in said action, Civil No. 2388, has a good and 
meritorious defense to the complaint therein in 
the fact that cross-complainant, at the time of 
the commencement of the said action, and for 
in ore than thirty ( 30) years prior thereto was, 
and ever since remained, the sole owner of said 
land in fee simple, in possession and entitled to 
the possession of said land, and was and is en-
titled to have his title quieted against any claims 
thereto made by said J. PARRY BOWEN, and 
any and all persons claiming any title or interest 
in said land under said Judgment. 
WHEREFORE, Cross-complainant prays: 
"1. That the said Judgment and Decree of 
this Court made and entered on the 13th day of 
November, 1946, in the case of J. PARRY 
BOWEN vs. CULBERT L. OLSON, Civil No. 
2388, be vacated and adjudged null and void, and 
that this cross-complainant, defendant in said ac-
tion be given the right to appear and answer, 
and/ or otherwise plead to plaintiff's complaint 
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therein, in order that the claims of the parties 
to said action and of persons claiming any rights 
or interests under and by virtue of said Judgment 
shall be decided upon their merits. 
"2. For such other and further relief as may 
be just and equitable in the premises." 
Respondents filed an Answer thereto which reads 
as follows: (242-6) 
"Come now the plaintiffs and cross-defend-
ants in the above entitled action and present the 
following defenses in answer to the cross-com-
plaint of the defendant CULBERT L. OLSON, 
amending and replacing his Third Amended 
Cross-complaint: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
"The said cross-complaint fails to state a 
claim against these plaintiffs and cross-defend-
ant upon which relief can be granted, and plain-
tiffs and cross-defendants hereby move this Court 
to dismiss said cross complaint of defendant CUL-
BERT L. OLSON. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
"The relief prayed for by cross-complainant 
in said cross-complaint is barred by the provi-
sions of Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Proced-
ure, and is further barred by the laches of said 
cross complainant, Culbert L. Olson. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
"Cross defendants further allege that at the 
time of the commencement of this action they were 
the owners and lessees, in the possessio':n and 
entitled to the possession of the following des-
cribed tract of land, situated in Uintah County, 
State of Utah, to-wit: North Half (n/2) of the 
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Southwest Quarter (SW/4) of Section thirty-four 
(34) in Tow·nship nne (1) of Section thirty-four 
(34) in Township one (1) South Range one (1) 
East of the Uintah Special Meridian . 
.. Cross Defendants further allege that they 
and their predecessors in title have been in the 
open, notorious, uninterrupted, adverse, continu-
ous, quiet and peaceful possession of the, lands 
described in the preceding paragraph abo:ve, un-
der color of title and claim of right in good faith, 
for a period of more than seven years prior to 
the commencement of this action, and have paid 
all taxes and assessments levied or assessed there-
on during said period. 
"Cross defendants further allege that the 
cross complainant Culbert L. Olson, and all per-
sons claiming by, through and under him, have 
not been seized nor possessed of the land des-
cribed above within seven years before the com-
mencement of this action, and that any claim or 
purported clailn of the said Culbert L. Olson to 
the lands above described, is barred by the provi-
sions of Section 104-2-5, Utah Code Annotated, 
1943, as amended by Chapter 18, Laws of Utah, 
1943; and by the provisions of Section 104-2-6, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, as amended by Chap-
ter 20, Laws of Utah, 1943; and by the provisions 
of Chapter 19, Laws of Utah, 1943, designated 
as Section 104-2-5.10, as amended by Chapter 
8, Laws of Utah, 1947. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
"Cross defendants refer to all of the defenses 
hereinbefore stated and the allegations therein 
contained, and incorporate them herein as though 
repeated verbatim in this fourth defense. In addi-
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tion, and for a fourth defense, the defendants spe-
cifically answer the allegations contained in said 
cross complaint of defendant Culbert L. Olson, 
amending and replacing his third amended cross 
complaint, as follows: 
"1. Cross defendants admit the allegations 
contained in paragraph 1 of said cross complaint, 
and allege that the said decree referred to was 
duly and regularly entered and is res adjudicata 
against all claims now made by the said cross 
defendant. 
"2. Cross defendants admit that they claim 
title and ownership interests in said land under 
and by virtue of said default judgment referred 
to in the allegation of Paragraph 2 of said cross 
complaint but deny that cross defendants' title 
and ownership interests in said land rest solely 
upon said default judgment against the cross 
complainant and cross defendants allege that their 
ownership and possession are based upon other 
meritorious rights and claims. 
"3. Cross defendants admit, that summons 
in said action was not personally served on the 
cross complainant, but deny all other allegations 
of paragraph 3 (a); cross defendants deny each 
and every of the allegations contained in para-
graph 3 (b); cross defendants deny the allegations 
contained in paragraph 3 (c) ; cross defendants 
deny the allegations contained in paragraph 3(d); 
cross defendants admit that the complaint, a 
summons with no return thereon, said affidavit of 
publication of summons, and the order issued by 
the Clerk of the Court for the publication of sum-
mons in a weekly newspaper published in Uintah 
County, were all filed and issued on the same day, 
September 11, 1946, but cross defendants deny 
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each and every of the remaining allegations con-
tained in Paragraph 3(e); cross defendants admit 
that proof of publication was filed on November 
12, 1946, with a precipe to enter default of de-
fendants and at the same time the defendants' de-
fault was entered by the Clerk of said Court, but 
cross defendants deny each and every of the re-
maining allegations contained in paragraph 3(f); 
cross defendants admit that the assessment rolls 
for each and every year since 1929 until and in-
cluding the year 1938 show that the land was 
assessed to 'Culbert L. Olson, 910 Stock Exchange 
Building, Los Angeles, California,' and cross 
defendants deny each and every of the remaining 
allegations contained in Paragraph 3(g); cross 
defendants are without knowledge or information 
sufficient to form a belief as to the facts alleged 
in paragraph 3(h) and therefore deny them, and 
cross defendants specifically deny that the af-
fiant in said affidavit knew that cross complainant 
was elected Governor of California, that cross 
complainant was well known in the State of Utah 
and among the citizens of Uintah County, and that 
any good faith inquiry would have disclosed cross 
complainant's place of residence and post office 
address to any person seeking service of summons 
on him in said action; cross defendants admit 
that said action was brought to quiet title to said 
land in cross defendant, J. Parry Bowen, as 
against the cross complainant but cross defend-
ants deny each and every of the remaining alle-
gations contained in paragraph 3(i); cross de-
fendants deny each and every of the allegations 
contained in Paragraph 3 (j). 
"4. Cross defendants are without knowledge 
or information sufficient to form a belief as to 
the following facts alleged in Paragraph 4 of said 
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cross complaint; cross complainant further al-
leges that he never received any notice of any kind 
and did not know of the filing of said action, or 
of any proceedings therein or connected there-
with, or that said judgment had been entered, or 
that said action ever existed, and therefore, denies 
them, and cross defendants deny each and every 
of the remaining allegations contained in said 
Paragraph 4 and allege that cross complainant 
had actual notice of said decree against him on 
December 19, 1949, and cross defendants specifi-
cally deny that cross-complainant was led by 
counsel for cross defendants to believe that they 
did not intend to rely on the validity of said 
judgment and would not oppose the vacation of 
said judgment as being invalid. 
"5. Cross defendants deny the allegation 
contained in paragraph 5 of said cross complaint 
and allege that these cross defendants and plain-
tiffs are the owners and lessees in the possession 
and entitled to the possession of said land and 
the whole thereof." 
WHEREFORE, cross defendants pray: 
"1. That cross complainant, Culbert L. 
Olson, take nothing by his cross complaint, amend-
ing and replacing his third amended cross com-
plaint, and that the same be dismissed at cross 
complainant's costs. 
"2. That cross defendants and plaintiffs 
have judgment against cross complainant and 
defendant, Culbert L. Olson, quieting the title of 
cross defendants and plaintiffs in and to the lands 
subject to this action. 
"3. That cross defendants and plaintiffs be 
granted the prayers contained in the original 
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complaint on file herein and that Plaintiffs and 
cross defendants be awarded costs of suit. 
"4. For such other and further relief as may 
be meet and proper." 
Appellants filed an Answer to the affirmative allega-
tions of said Answer of respondents, which reads as fol-
lows: (R. 247 -9) 
"Answering the cross-claim of cross-defend-
ants to the cross-complainant of CULBERT L. 
OLSON amending and replacing his Third 
Amended Cross-complaint, said cross complain-
ant, 
"Denies each and every allegation contained 
in the paragraphs of said answer designated as 
cross-defendant's First Defense, Second Defense, 
and Third Defense. 
"Denies the same allegations incorporated in 
the paragraph of said Answer designated as 
cross-defendant's Fourth Defense, and denies the 
allegation in paragraph 1 of said Fourth Defense 
that said decree was duly and regularly entered 
and is res adjudicata against all claims now made 
by said cross complaint, and denies the allegations 
contained in paragraph 5 of said F'ourth Defense 
that these cross-defendants and plaintiffs are the 
owners and lessee, in possession and entitled to 
the possession of said land; and denies that said 
cross-defendants or either of them or any person 
under whom they or either of them claim an in-
terest in said land were ever in the possession or 
entitled to the possession of said land or any part 
thereof." 
On June 30, 1950, respondents served and filed an-
other n1otion for summary judgment, which reads as 
follows: (R. 253) 
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"Come now the plaintiffs and cross-defend-
ants in the above-entitled action and move the 
court for summary judgment upon the record 
now before the court, consisting of the files and 
records in this matter, and the file in Civil Action 
No. 2388, and abstract of title heretofore intro-
duced in evidence. This motion is made upon the 
following allegations: 
"1. That the cross complaint of defendant 
Culbert L. Olson amending and replacing his 
third Amended Cross Complaint is a mere col-
lateral attack upon the judgment in Civil Action 
No. 2388, and said judgment and decree is res 
judicata against the said defendant and cross-
complainant, Culbert L. Olson. 
"2. That the attempt to set aside the decree 
in Civil Action No. 2388 is barred by the provi-
sions of Rule 60(b) of Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. 
"3. That the defendant and cross complain-
ant, Culbert L. Olson, is guilty of laches in de-
fending this action. 
"4. That the said Decree in Civil Action No. 
2388 was duly and regularly entered, is not void 
on its face, and is a vaild decree for all purposes." 
This Inotion was noticed for hearing on July 14, 1950, 
(R. 254) but was not heard by the Court until September 
11, 1950, when it was argued and subn1itted for the 
Court's ruling. (R. 256) The Court made no ruling until 
January 25, 1951, when it made a minute order granting 
said motion. (R. 258) 
No notice of said ruling was given to appellant, and 
appellant was not inforrned that a ruling had been made 
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until nearly a n1onth had elapsed when, in response to 
appellant's inquiry of Judge NELSON as to when a 
ruling might be expected appellant was informed that the 
motion had been granted on January 25, 1951. 
No formal judgment was entered pursuant to said 
ruling. 
Appellant again communicated with Judge NELSON 
on April 20, 1951, asking that a fina;l judgment be en-
tered from which an appeal would lie and submitted a 
formal judgment in accordance with his ruling for that 
purpose. 
Judge NELSON answered that request on April 
23,1951,saying: 
"I have this day talked with GEORGE 
STANLEY, attorney for Mr. BOWEN, who states 
that he prepared Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and decree in this matter and that the 
same would reach me within two days. I shall 
withhold the signing of the judgment you have 
prepared until I have had an opportunity to ex-
amine the papers he is sending. Will advise you 
further in the matter within the next few days." 
Appellant received no further advice from Judge 
NELSON, but did receive a letter from GEORGE B. 
STANLEY, dated May 4, 1951, in which he states: 
"I have been reluctant to bring the reason 
for the delay to the attention of the Judge and 
also to offer it as an alibi for not filing Findings, 
Conclusions and Decree before ... " 
However, Findings, Conclusions and Decree were 
not served and filed until July 7, 1951. 
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Said Findings and Conclusions are as follows: (R. 
267-275) 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
"This matter came on regularly for trial on 
the Complaint of the plaintiffs and the Amended 
Answer of the defendant, and on the Third Cross-
Complaint of the cross- complainant, and the An-
swer thereto of the cross-defendants, before the 
Court sitting without a jury on the first day of 
May, A. D., 1950, and was continued to the second 
day of May, and then to the ninth day of May, 
1950, GEORGE B. STANLEY, ROSCOE 
WALKER, Jr., and HUGH W. COLTON appear-
ing as attorneys for the plaintiffs and cross-de-
fendants, the defendant appearing in person and 
by his attorneys CLYDE JOHNSON, Esq., and 
CYRUS G. GATRELL, Esq., and the plaintiffs 
and cross-defendants J. PERRY BOWEN also 
known as J. PERRY BOWEN, KEITH J. 
BOWEN, :MORLEY DEAN, IRENE M. DEAN 
and J. A. CHENEY being personally present: 
"And the Court having requested the respec-
tive counsel to state the issues to be tried, and 
the various counsel having advised the Court that 
the issues to be tried consisted of the following: 
•'1. The validity of the Decree in Civil Ac-
tion No. 2388 in this Court, wherein J. PERRY 
BOWEN is plaintiff and CULBERT L. OLSON is 
defendant, which decree was entered in said action 
on the 13th day of November, 1946; 
"2. The claim of fee simple title from patent 
to the present time and claim of continuous pos-
session by the defendant and C'ross-complainant, 
CULBERT L. OLSON, as against the claim of ad-
verse possession by the plaintiffs and cross-de-
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fendants for a period of n1ore than seven years, 
and the further claim that said defendant and 
cross-complainant was barred from maintaining 
a defense or his cross-complaint by the limitations 
stated in the pleadings of plaintiffs and cross-
defendants ; 
··And the Court having advised the respective 
counsel that he would try first the issue on the 
validity of the Decree in said Civil Action No. 
2388, and if said decree were valid it would be res 
adjudicata in this cause against the defendant and 
cross-complainant, and the Court proceeded to 
try the issue so stated; 
"And the plaintiffs and cross-defendants re-
introduced the abstract of title to the prope,rty 
involved herein, and also introduced the file in 
said Civil Action No. 2388, and the same were re-
ceived in evidence without objection by the de-
fendant and cross-complainant; 
"And the plaintiffs and cross-defendants 
thereupon moved the Court for judgment upon 
the record before the Court, and the Court after 
hearing the arguments of counsel denied the said 
motion; 
"And the Court further decided that the 
Third Amended Cross-complaint of the said 
CULBERT L. OLSON makes a collateral attack 
on the said decree in said Civil Action No. 2388, 
that said decree is a valid decree and is res ad-
judicata against the said defendant and cross-
complainant CULBERT L. OLSON on the issues 
involved herein; 
And the Court allowed the defendant and 
cross-complainant ten days in which to further 
plead, and the said defendant and cross-complain-
ant filed his Cross-complaint Amending and Re-
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placing his Third Amended Cross-Complaint; 
"And the plaintiffs and cross-defendants filed 
an Answer to said last Cross-complaint, and also 
made and filed a l\Iotion for Summary Judgment 
upon the record before the Court, consisting of the 
files and records in this matter, the file in said 
Action No. 2388, and the abstract of title here-
tofore introduced in evidence; 
•'And the Court heard the Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment on the eleventh day of Septem-
ber, 1950, and heard the arguments of GEORGE 
B. STANLEY, attorney for plaintiffs and cross-
defendants, and CLYDE S. JOHNSON, attorney 
for defendant and cross-complainant, and after 
examining the files, records and the briefs of the 
respective parties in this matter, made and en-
tered his minute entry on January 25th, 1951, 
granting the Inotion of plaintiffs and cross-de-
fendants; 
"And being fully advised in the premises, the 
Court now makes the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
.. 1. That the defendant and cross-complain-
ant, CULBERT L. OLSON, is now and has been 
for more than twenty years last past prior to the 
commencement of this action a resident of the 
State of California; 
"2. That Civil Action No. 2388 was prose-
cuted in this Court by J. PERRY BOWEN, Plain-
tiff, against CULBERT L. OLSON, and unknown 
defendants, to quiet the title of plaintiff in and to 
the lands hereinafter described; 
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"3. That the plaintiff and defendant in said 
Civil Action No. 2388 are the same parties as 
the plaintiff and cross-defendant, J. PARRY 
BOWEN, and the defendant and cross-complain-
ant, CULBERT L. OLSON in this action; 
"4. That a Lis Pendens was made in said 
Civil Action No. 2388, which Lis Pendens was 
dated August 2-lth, 1946, and recorded September 
11th, 1946, in Book '11' of Miscellaneous, page 1 
of the records in the office of the County Recorder 
of Uintah County, State of Utah; 
"5. That the _A._ffidavit for Publication of 
Summons in said Civil Action No. 2388 recite~ 
that the defendant, CULBERT L. OLSON, is a 
non-resident of the State of Utah, and that his 
address is unknown ; 
"6. That a Decree was entered in this Court 
in said Civil Action No. 2388 on November 13th, 
1946, quieting the title of the plaintiff against 
the defendant, to the lands hereinafter described, 
which Decree was recorded December 2nd, 1946, 
at 2:40 P.l\L, in Book "36" of Deeds, page 130 
of the records in the office of the County Recorder 
of said Uintah County, State of Utah. 
"7. That the defendant and cross-complain-
ant CULBERT L. OLSON received the Abstract 
of Title No. 790 in evidence herein, on December 
19th, 1949, which abstract of title at pages 51 
and 52 sets forth in full a copy of the Decree as 
recorded in said Book "36" of Deeds, page 130 
of said county records ; 
"8. That in the said Decree so made and 
recorded this Court recited: "The defendants, 
having been regularly served the Summons and 
failed to answer the same or otherwise plead:" 
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"9. That the defendant and cross-complain-
ant, CULBERT L. OLSON made no attack on 
the validity of the said Decree in said Civil 
Action No. 2388 until the filing herein of his 
First An1ended Cross-complaint on March 31st, 
1950, more than three months after receiving 
the abstract of title mentioned in paragraph 7 
of these findings, and n1ore than three years after 
the entry and recording of the said Decree; 
"10. That the said Decree in said Civil 
Action No. 2388 is not void on its face; 
"'1. That the Cross-complaint Amending 
and Replacing his Third Amended Cross-com-
plaint made by the said CULBERT L. OLSON 
does not ·allege that the said Decree in said Civil 
Action No. 2388 is void on its face. and attacks 
said decree on the ground of fraud. 
"12. That by reason of the said Decree in 
said Civil Action No. 2388 the plaintiffs and 
cross""defendants are the owners and lessee in 
the possession and entitled to possession of the 
real estate hereinafter described; 
"13. That the defendant and cross-complain-
ant CULBERT L. OLSON, claims some right, 
title interest, lien, encumbrance and estate in, to, 
upon and against the real estate hereinafter 
described or some part thereof adverse to the 
.right, title, and interest in said real estate of 
plaintiffs, but that the said defendant and cross-
complainant is estopped from setting up any claim 
or claims to the hereinafter described real estate 
by reason of the said Decree in said Civil Action 
No. 2388; 
•'14. That the plaintiffs and cross-defend-
ants are entitled to a judgment and decree of this 
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Court quieting their title in and to the land~ 
described in the C01nplaint and hereinafter par-
ticularly described, and for a further judgment 
for their cost~ expended herein, against the said 
defendant and cross-c01nplainant, CULBERT L. 
OLSON. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the 
Court no'v makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the Cross-complaint of Defendant 
CULBERT L. OLSON Amending and Replacing 
his Third Amended Cross-complaint on file herein 
is a mere collateral attack upon the judgment 
in Civil Action No. 2388 in this Court, and said 
judgment and decree is res adjudicata against 
the said defendant and cross-complainant, CUL-
BERT L. OLSON. 
2. That the cause of action in said Cross-
complaint to set aside the Decree in said Civil 
Action No. 2388 is barred by the provisions of 
Rule 60(b) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
3. That the defendant and cross-complain-
ant, CULBERT L. OLSON, is guilty of laches 
in the premises. 
4. That the said Decree in Civil Action No. 
2388 was duly and regularly entered, is not void 
on its face, and is a valid decree for all purposes, 
and this Court is without jurisdiction to set aside 
the same. 
5. That the plaintiffs, and each and all of 
them, whether denominated as plaintiffs or cross-
defendants, are entitled to a Decree and J udg-
Inent of this Court quieting their and each of 
their title against all clain1s, demands or pre-
tentions of the defendant and cross-complainant, 
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CULBERT L. OLSON, as set forth in the find-
ings of fact herein, and a:ll persons claiming or 
to claim the hereinafter described real property 
or any part thereof, through or under said defend-
ant and cross-complainant, and that all of them 
be perpetually estopped fron1 setting up any 
claims thereto, or any part thereof. 
6. That the plaintiffs are entitled to a judg-
ment against the said defendant and cross-com-
plainant, CULBERT L. OLSON, for their costs 
expended herein. 
That the property herein mentioned is situ-
ated in Uintah County, State of Utah, and is de-
scribed as follows, t~wit: 
Township 1 South of Range 1 West of the 
U intah 8 pecial Meridian. 
Section 34: Ny2SW1_4 
Dated this 4th day of June, A.D., 1951. 
(s) JOSEPH E. NELSON 
Judge" 
Appellant served and filed Objections and Proposed 
Amendments to the Findings to embrace parts of the 
record hereinabove related (R.277 -83) and filed a state-
ment in support of his Objections and Proposed Amend-
ments, \vhich were made a part of the record at the 
hearing thereof which reads as follows (R. 286-94): 
APPELLANT'S OBJECTIONS TO FINDINGS AND 
CONCLUSIONS 
THE RECORD shows that: This action 
was commenced by plaintiffs in August, 1948; 
Defendant, CULBERT L. OLSON, was not 
served until September 16, 1949, when he received 
personal service of summons and complaint at 
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910 Stock Exc.hange Building, 639 South Spring 
Street, Los Angeles 14, California; that defend-
ant duly filed his original answer admitting that 
he clain1ed ownership of the land involved, ad-
verse to the claims of plaintiffs, denying the 
contrary allegations of the complaint and praying 
that his title to said land be quieted. That on 
September 19, 1949, defendant communicated with 
plaintiffs counsel, George B. Stanley, asking why 
plaintiffs were claiming this land against him. 
It was not until December 29, 1949, that defend-
ant received in response to this inquiry an ab-
stract of title with the following letter from 
George B. Stanley, attorney for plaintiffs, dated 
December 14, 1949, which was read to the Court 
at its hearing of plaintiffs first motion for sum-
mary judgment on May 9, 1950 (see letter quoted 
verbatim, page 4.) 
"That defendant was afflicted with influenza 
and was confined to bed at about the time of 
receiving said abstract of title (see affidavit filed 
January 5, 1950) ; that it was not until on or 
about January 5, 1950, that defendant discovered 
the reference in said abstract to a judgment in 
a case described in said abstract as that of J. 
PARRY BOWDEN or J. PARRY BOWN v. 
CULBERT L. OLSON, to which no reference wa~ 
made by plaintiff's counsel as a ground for their 
claim of title to said land. 
"That defendant filed his original cross-com-
plaint herein to quiet his title against Plaintiff 
J. PARRY BOWEN describing him as also known 
as J. PARRY BOWDEN and J. PARRY BOWN 
believing and alleging that the J. PARRY BOW-
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DEN and J. PARRY BOWN referred to is the 
same person as J. PARRY BOWEN in this case. 
"That on March 27, 1950, defendant and 
cross-complainant served and filed his first 
Amended Cross-complaint specifically attacking 
said judgment as being void. 
"That on April 3rd, 1950, as shown by a 
transcripts of record of a hearing before the 
Court on that date, a copy of which is set forth 
in defendant and cross-complainant's Objections 
and Proposed Amendments to the Court's Find-
ings, heretofore duly presented to said Court, 
counsel for plaintiff and cross-defendant admitted 
in open Court on that date that he 1nay have gone 
too far in stating to defendant prior thereto that 
plaintiff would make no claim under said judg-
Inent; and counsel also stated to the Court that: 
•\Ve are not taking that (judgment) too seriously, 
I don't think we will press it.' 
"Counsel for plaintiff and cross-defendant 
also then stipulated that the tax deed to the 
County and the tax deed from the County to 
Burns Hallett and the deed fron1 Burns Hallett 
to J. PARRY BOWEN shown in the abstract of 
title to which the findings refer are invalid as 
conveyances of any title to said land. Therefore, 
it is admitted that the l~gal record title to said 
land is in defendant and cross-complainant as 
shown by said abstract of title, yet the Court's 
Fndings make no mention of these facts and 
stipulations. 
"That defendant and cross-complainant made 
an offer of proof on May 9th, 1950, as shown in 
the reporters transcript on file, before the Court 
. ruled on a previous motion for summary judg-
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1nent denying the smue whic.h offer of proof i~ 
not included in the Court's findings. 
··After ~tating a c.onclusion of law as a 'find-
ing of facf that 'the said dec.ree in said Civil 
Action No. 2:~ss is not void on it's face' the Court 
makes the following amazing as it's finding num-
ber 11: 
"11. That the cross-cmnplaint amending and 
replacing his third amended cross-complaint made 
by Culbert L. Olson does not allege that said 
decree in said civil ac.tion No. 2388 is void on it'8 
face and attacks the said decree on the ground 
of fraud." 
"This seen1~ to ilnply that the judgment i:-; 
void on it's face but nevertheless is res adjudicata 
bec.ause the cross-c01nplaint does not use the 
words "on it's face". But the cross complaint 
does attack the judgn1ent as being void both on 
it's face and also for the reasons given that it 
was obtained by fraud. Paragraph 3 says: 'Cross 
complainant alleges that said default judgment 
is void, and c.ross c.omplainant claims the right to 
have the same vacated as null and void because 
and by reason of the following fac.ts', and goes 
on to show that the judgment is void both on it's 
face as well as having been scured by fraud. 
Paragraph 3 (b) of the cross complaint shows 
specifically why the judgment is void on it's face. 
The affidavit for publication of summons ts, or 
was then, a part of the Judgment Roll. 
Finding number 9 says: 
"Defendant and cross complainant Culbert 
L. Olson Inade no attack on the validity of the said 
decree in Civil action number 2388 until the filing 
herein of his first amended cross complaint on 
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:March 31, 1950, more than three months after 
receiving the abstract of title mentioned in para-
graph 7 of these findings, and more than three 
years after the entry and recording of the said 
decree". But as heretofore shown, no mention is 
made of the record showing that defendant and 
cross compainant was led by counsel for plaintiffs 
and cross defendants to believe that they would 
not rely on that decree and would not oppose it's 
being vacated when brought to the attention of 
the Court; that because of it's invalidity the pre-
sent action was brought; and the allegation of the 
cross complaint with reference to that matter are 
disregarded in the findings. 
"However, since another of the Court's con-
clusions of Law is that 'the cause of action in 
said cross-complaint to set aside the decree in 
Civil Action 2388 is barred b ythe provisions of 
Rule 60(b) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure', it 
would not alter that erroneous conclusion if the 
cross complaint had been filed one day after three 
n1onths had expired from the date the decree was 
entered, furthermore the provisions of that rule 
as to time refers only to rnotions for relief made 
in the case itself. 
"This rule does not limit the power of the 
Court to entertain an independent action to re-
lieve a party from a judgment, order or proceed-
ing, or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon 
the Court". (Rule 60(b) ). 
"Defendants' original answer to the com-
plaint, filed when served with summons and com-
plaint, asserted his right to the land against all 
clai1ns of the plaintiff and asks for judgment 
against J. Parry Bowen, et al., plaintiffs in this 
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case, quieting defendants title to the land in ques-
tion whatever 1night be the nature of their claims, 
whether based upon an invalid tax title, an in-
valid decree or other false claims. So also did 
defendants• original c.ross complaint filed herein 
on or about the 6th day of January, 1950. 
It is true that in his original attac.ks on all 
clain1s of plaintiffs to said land, no speeific men-
tion was n1ade of the invalid decree in civil action 
2388 aftr defendant learned of the smne follow-
ing receipt of the abstract of title until the 
serring and filing of his first amended cross-
complaint on March 27th, 1950, because he was 
led to believe, as heretofore stated, that plaintiffs 
did not rely upon said judgment and would not 
resist its' being vacated. 
"Notwithstanding this record, the Court has 
accepted and signed a finding that "the defendant 
and cross complainant, Culbert L. Olson, is guilty. 
of laches in the premises". 
"What possible disadvantage to plaintiffs and 
cross-defendants can be found in the fact that 
defendant and cross-complainant did not refer 
to the judgment in case No. 2388 in the assertion 
in his answer and cross-complaint filed prior to 
the filming of his first amended cross-complaint 
of his right and title to the property as against the 
claims of plaintiffs and cross-defendants? No 
laches of defendant and cross-complainant can 
be truthfully and legally found in the case. 
"If one were looking for laches or unreason-
able delays in this case, reference might be made 
to the following record: 
"1. Plaintiffs failed to serve defendant Cul-
bert L. Olson with summons and complaint herein 
for a period of thirteen months from the date 
the complaint was filed. 
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"2. On May 29, 1950, following the disposi-
tion of motions made by plaintiffs, issues were 
finally joined upon the complaint as to defendant 
Culbert L~ Olson, defendants amended answer 
thereto, the cross-complaint of defendant amend-
ing and replacing his third amended cross-com-
plaint, cross-defendants answer thereto, and 
cross-complainants answer to the cross claim con-
tained in said cross-defendants answer. On that 
date defendant and cross-complainant filed a re-
quest for trial on the first available date and 
gave notice thereof. No trial date was fixed by 
the Court pursuant to said notice. 
"3. On June 30, 1950, plaintiffs and cross-
defendants served a second motion for summary 
judgment and noticed it for hearing on July 
14, 1950. 
''4. Said second motion for summary judg-
ment was not heard by the court until September 
11, 1950, when it was argued and submitted to the 
Court for its ruling. 
"5. The Court made no ruling on this second 
motion for summary judgment until January 25, 
1951, when it made a minute order granting said 
motion. Rule 56 (c) of the Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure provides; 'that the (summary) judgment 
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the plead-
ings, depositions and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issues as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
n1atter of law." 
"6. No notice was given to defendant and 
cross-complainant of the court's ruling on said 
motion and defendant and cross-complainant had 
no knowledge thereof until nearly a month had 
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elapsed since said ruling was n1ade and upon 
inquiry of Judge Nelson ascertained front him 
that he had ruled on the 1i1otion on January 
25, 1951. 
"7. K o judgment was entered pursuant to 
said ruling. 
"8. Defendant and cross-complainant again 
on April 20, 1951, conununicated with Judge Nel-
son asking that formal judgment be entered from 
which an appeal would lie and subtnitted a formal 
judgment in accordance with his ruling for that 
purpose. 
"9. Judge Nelson answered this request on 
April 2:3, 1951, sa~ing: 'I have this day talked 
with George Stanley, attorney for l\fr Bowen, 
who stated that he prepared findings of fact, con-
clusions of law and decree inthis matter and that 
the satne would reach 1ne within two days. I 
shall withhold the signing of the judgment you 
have prepared until I have had an opportunity to 
examine the papers he is sending. Will advise 
you further in the matter within the next 
few days." 
"But defendant and cross-complainant re-
ceived no further advice from Judge Nelson. 
Defendant and cross-complainant received a let-
ter dated May 4, 1951, from George B. Stanley, 
attorney for plaintiffs and cross-defendants in 
which he stated: 'I have been reluctant to bring 
the reasons for the delay, (in submitting findings 
and judgment), to the attention of the Judge and 
also to offer it as an alibi for not filing finding-~. 
conclusions and decree before.' 
"With that letter Mr. Stanley enclosed a copy 
of a letter he wrote Judge Nelson dated :May 4, 
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1951, in which he states: "J. Parry Bowen, one 
of the plaintiffs, died November 30th, 1950, Peti-
tion for letter of administration were filed Decem-
ber 22, 1950, by his widow with Hugh W. Colton 
as attorney. The order appointing the admini-
stratrix January 12, 1951. The bond of the 
administratrix was filed l\farch 24, 1951." The 
letter further states that it was his understanding 
that no further proceedings can be had until the 
personal representative has been appointed and 
qualified: that just as soon as letters of admini-
stration have been filed with the clerk, the pro-
posed findings, conclusions and decree will be 
forwarded to Judge Nelson and served upon 
Culbert L. Olson. 
"10. Proposed findings, conclusions and de-
cree prepared by counsel for plaintiffs and cross-
defendants were not served on defendant and 
cross-complainant until July 7, 1951, when a copy 
thereof purported to be signed by Judge Nelson 
under date of June 4, 1951, was delivered to 
Clyde S. Johnson of counsel for defendant and 
cross-complainant and said findings, conclusions 
and judgment were on that date filed in the clerks 
office and the judg1nent was entered. 
"The Courts' conclusion of law that the cross-
complaint of defendant Culbert L. Olson 
amending and replacing the third amended cross-
complaint 'is a mere collateral attack upon the 
judgment in civil action No. 2388 in this Court' 
is shown to be erroneous under the authorities 
cited in the brief submitted to the Court by 
defendant and cross-complainant on September 
11, 1950, at the time of the hearing of the motion 
for summary judgment, to which may be added 
reference to Rule 13(a), (b) and (f) of Utah 
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Rules of Civil Procedure which allow for any 
ero~~ clailn against plaintiff~. 
"Defendant and cross-emnplainant here re-
peats the contention 1nade in his eo1n1nunication 
under date of l\lay 10, 1951, to Judge Nelson in 
which he stated that the 1naking of findings of fact 
and conclusions of law are not only not required 
but are in1proper and tmneeessary to the entry of 
a su1nmary judg~nent; that a finding and con-
clusion 'that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the nwving party is en-
titled to a judgment as a matter of law' upon the 
entire record is implicit in granting of a motion 
for a sUininary judg~nent. (Rules 56( c) and 52( a) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
'"'VE RESPECTFULLY SUBl\IIT, that 
"1. No findings and conclusions should be 
made inas1nuch as the whole record in the case 
must be reviewed to determine whether there is 
a genuine issue to be tried. 
"2. The findings signed and filed are incom-
plete and erroneous as hereinbefore shown, and 
if findings are to remain amend1nents thereto as 
proposed by defendant and eross-complainant 
should be n1ade. 
"3. The Courts' conclusions of law a·re er-
roneous and the judgment is against law." 
Appellants objections and proposed a1nendments to 
said findings and conclusions were overruled and denied. 
(Trans proc. July 27, 1951. R. 301-15). 
JUDGMENT ROLL IN CIVIL ACTION 2388 
In addition to the allegations of appellant's said 
cross-complaint amending and replaeing his Third 
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Amended Cross-complaint re the judgment roll in Civil 
Action 2388 which are admitted in respondent's answer 
thereto, we quote here in full the affidavit for publication 
of summons and the Clerk's order for such publication. 
(File in Action 2388, Exhibit.) 
AFFIDAVIT FOR PUBLICATION OF SUMMONS 
"Hugh "\V. Colton, being first duly sworn, 
deposes and says: That he is the attorney for 
the plaintiff in the above entitled action. 
That on the 11th day of September, A.D., 
1946, the said plaintiff caused a verified Com-
plaint to be filed in said action, alleging that the 
defendant Culbert L. Olson, claims to have some 
interest in and to the premises described therein 
adverse to the estate and interest of the said plain-
tiff, and praying that the defendant be compelled 
to show his said claim and it be determined to be 
null and void as against the said plaintiff, and 
that the defendant be forever barred and pre-
cluded from all right, title and interest in and 
to said premises and each and every part thereof. 
"That the defendant, Culbert L. Olson, re-
sides outside the State of Utah, and person ser-
vice thereon cannot be had." 
"That this action is brought to quiet title tD 
land within this countv as described in the Com-
plaint which is referred to and by adoption, made 
a part hereof. That affiant, for the purpose of 
finding said defendant, has made diligent search 
and inquiry in the State of Utah, and has checked 
the records of both to detern1ine the last address 
of the defendant, and finds that his last address 
was: 
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Culbert L. Olson-Pnknown 
Affiant therefore states that personal service 
cannot be had and prays that service of Smn-
Inons be had by publication in the Vernal Express, 
a newspaper in Uintah County State of Utah, 
wherein the land is located. 
(s) Hugh''"'"· Colton 
Subscribed and sworn to before 1ne this 11th 
day of Sept. 1946. 
( s) F. L. Noel, Uintah County Clerk 
Notary Public 
Residing at Vernal, Utah 
(No seal 1na.de) 
FILED : Septe1nber 11, 1946." 
ORDER FOR PUBLICATION 
•·It satisfactorily appearing from the Affi-
davit of Hugh W. Colton that the above entitled 
action relates to real property in this State, in 
which the defendant herein claims or makes clain1 
and interest, actual or contingent, and that the 
relief sought in said action consists wholly in 
excluding the defendant herein fron1 any interest 
in or lien upon said real property; and it appear-
ing that the defendant named in said Affidavit 
resides outside the State of Utah and cannot, 
after due diligence be found within this State, and 
that he does not have an office or process agent 
residing within the State of Utah, and that his 
place of residence is outside the State of Utah 
and personal service thereon cannot be had. 
"NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby ordered 
that the service of Sunrmons upon the said de-
fendant be made by publication in the Vernal 
Express a newspaper of general circulation 
printed and published in the County of Uintah, 
State of Ctah, which publication shall be at least 
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once a week for five successive weeks. 
Dated this 11th day of September, A.D. 1946. 
(s) F. L. Noel, Clerk 
FILED: September 11, 1946." 
Because the record on appeal consists of all the 
pleadings, original papers and transcripts of proceedings 
in the Court below, Appellant has quoted at length from 
the pleadings and record of proceedings in the belief 
that it will serve the convenience of this Court in its 
consideration of this appeal. If appellant has overlooked 
the inclusion of any essential part of the record before 
the Court below appellant invites its supplementation 
by respondents. 
POINTS ON WHICH APPELLANT INTENDS TO RELY 
FOR A REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE 
COURT BELOW 
(Directed to the grounds alleged in respondents 
1notion and accepted by the lower court as its "Findings 
of fact and conclusion of law.") 
POINT I 
THE JUDGEMENT IN CIVIL ACTION NO. 2388 IS 
VOID ON ITS FACE. 
POINT 2 
THE JUDGMENT IN CIVIL ACTION NO. 2388 WAS 
OBTAINED BY FRAUD UPON THE COURT. 
POINT 3 
APPELLANT'S CROSS-COMPLAINT IS A DIRECT AT-
TACK ON SAID JUDGMENT. IT IS COMPULSORY UNDER 
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RULE 13(a) AND WOULD BE PERMISSIVE UNDER RULE 
13 (b) OF UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1950, IF 
IT COULD BE CONSIDERED A COLLATERAD ATTACK 
UNDER PREVIOUS UTAH STATUTES AND DECISIONAL 
LAW. 
POINT 4 
THE CAUSE OF ACTION SET FORTH IN APPEL-
LANT'S CROSS-COMPLAINT IS: 
A. NOT BARRED BY THE PROVISIONS OF RULE 60 (b) OF 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1950; 
B. APPELLANT IS NOT GUILTY OF LACHES IN THE PREMISES 
AND HIS CROSS-COMPLAINT CANNOT BE BARRED ON THAT 
GROUND. 
POINT 5 
THE RECORD IN THIS CASE DISPROVES THE ALLE-
ffi GATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT IN ACTION NO. 2388, 
AND PROVES CONCLUSIVELY THAT APPELLANT HAS 
A MERITORIUS DEFENSE THERETO AS WELL AS TO 
RESPONDENT'S COMPLAINT IN THIS SECOND ACTION. 
;;_. 
POINT 6 
THAT THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM 
IS NOT AUTHORIZED BY RULE 56 OF UTAH RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE AND VIOLATES ITS EXPRESS PRO-
VISIONS. 
POINT 7 
THAT SAID SUMMARY JUDGMENT DENIES APPEL-
LANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS 
~: OF LAW. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE JUDGMENT IN CIVIL ACTION NO. 2388 
IS VOID ON ITS FACE 
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The court's assertion in its decree in Action No. 
2388 that the defendant was duly served with a Summons 
and that his default for failure to appear had been duly 
entered is shown to be untrue on the face of the judg-
ment roll of which the affidavit and order for publication 
of Summons based thereon constitute the vital part and 
basis for granting said default decree. 
The affidavit and order in said action are as much 
a part of the judgment roll as is the default decree. 
(Utah Code Ann. 1943, 104-30-14). 
As stated in appellant's cross-complaint, the affi-
davit to support the order for publication of summons 
and the default decree is wholly insufficient: 
"In that it did not state probatory or eviden-
tiary facts frmn which a judge or clerk of said 
court could determine that the place of residence 
of the defendant was unknown, that said affidavit 
does not state that the place of residence of de-
fendant was unknown to plaintiff or to his attor:. 
ney who made said affidavit, that said affidavit 
does not contain probative or evidentiary facts 
frmn which it could be determined by a judge or 
clerk of said court that any effort was made by 
pmiuLlff or the affiant in said affidavit to ascertain 
the place of residence of the defendant; that said 
affidavit does not contain probative or evidentiary 
facts from which a judge or clerk of said court 
could determine what, if any, diligence was used 
by said affiant in his alleged 'diligent search and 
inquiry in the State of Utah for the purpose of 
finding the defendant', or in what record or where 
the affiant found, as stated in his affidavit, that 
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the defendant's last known address was 'Culbert 
L. Olson-unknown.'' 
If there has ever been a more insufficient and equi-
vocal affidavit for publication of smnmons to avoid 
personal service on a defendant an1ong all such affidavits 
that have been held insufficient to support an order for 
publication of surmnons in the State of Utah or else-
"There, appellant has been lmable to find it. 
~lfter stating that "defendant Culbert L. Olson 
resides outside of the State of Utah, and person service 
(presmnably for that reason) thereon cannot be had 
thereon" the affidavit states ·'that affiant, for the purpose 
of finding said defendant has made diligent search and 
inquiry (to find hiln) in the State of Utah, and has 
checked the records of both (both of what and wha.t 
records J) to determine the last address of the defendant, 
and finds that his last address was: Culbert L. Olson-
unknown." 
\Vhat records did affiant check to find an address 
where none is given~ What record did affiant find in 
the State of r tah where the nan1e Culbert L. Olson is 
followed by the word "unknown"~ The affiant signifi-
<·antly does not state what records he "checked". The 
affidavjt does not state that either the plaintiff or his 
attorney making the affidavit did not know appellant's 
place of residence outside the State of utah. 
The entire affidavit is meaningless beyond the state-
ment that defendant resides outside of the State of 
rtah, which statement affiant made of his own knowl-
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edge, but he did not give defendant's place of residence 
outside the State of Utah, which he must also have 
known of his own knowledge, in connection with his own 
knowledge that "defendant resides outside of the State.'· 
How did the affiant know that? He does not say in order 
not to expose the fact that he knew appellant's place of 
residence outside of the state. 
From affiant's statement of the foregoing conclu-
sion as to his diligence-without one single supporting 
fact-the trial court nevertheless concludes that the de-
fault judgment rendered thereon is not void but in res 
adjudicata. Perhaps the court below mistakenly believes 
that a failure to set forth the facts constituting "dili-
gence" is a mere defect of process like a misspelled word. 
But the judgment is void on its face because the affidavit 
without which no due process or valid default judgment 
could be procured is fatally insufficient, in that no facts 
are stated in proof that any effort at all was made to 
locate appellant or his place· of residence. Affiant could 
not have been diligent because the record shows his 
lack of diligence. Affiant's omission to swear to any fact 
from which it 1night be reasonably inferred that he exer-
cised any diligence at all to "find" appellant is as fatal 
to the order based thereon for publication of summons 
and to the resultant judgment as though no affidavit 
at all had been sworn to or filed in the action. Without 
swearing to facts the state1nent can swear to nothing. 
The affidavit cannot be its own interpreter and thus 
deprive the court or clerk of their respective dutie~ 
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toward it. The imperative duties imposed by statute 
to expedite service of process on non-residents must be 
legally discharged, in the absence of which the founda-
tion of the court's jurisdiction is destroyed. There can-
not be a valid default judgment res adjudicata of a 
non-resident's property rights founded upon a void serv-
ice of process. 
The mere self-serving statement that due, diligence 
has been exercised does not constitute proof of the pre-
requisite jurisdictional fact. It is not sufficient to merely 
state a legal conclusion in the language or form pre-
scribed in the Statute-to say in effect "I have used 
due diligence. The non-resident's whereabouts is un-
known." That statement might be made by anyone with-
out any effort or without making the slightest inquiry 
to ascertain the whereabouts of a non-resident owner 
of real property. Probative and evidentiary facts show-
ing diligence (if diligence means what it implies and is 
defined as meaning) must be set forth in the body of 
the affidavit so that the court will be informed and the 
record will show what, if any, diligence was exercised, 
and whether an effort was seriously and in good faith 
made calculated to locate and inform the non-resident 
defendant of an action against him or his property. 
~l default judgment based upon such a fictitious and 
nonsensical affidavit for service by publication instead 
of by personal service is only a purported judgment, 
void on its face, for neither the· clerk's order for pub-
lication nor the court's decree following such void pro-
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cess gave the court jurisdiction to enter a valid judg; 
ment. 
Leibhardt v. Lawrence, 40 Utah 243, 120 P. 
215. 
In re Waters Estate (1941), 100 etah 246, 
251, 113 P. 2nd 1038. 
Counsel for respondents doubtless agreed with ap-
pellant or they certainly would not have brought this 
second action in an attempt to secure a valid judg1nent 
against appellant to quiet the same plaintiff's alleged 
title to the same land. Respondents in bringing this 
second action and their counsel admitted as n1uch, as is 
shown by the record. (State1nent of Facts, page 6). 
A judg1nent is held void where it is based on sub-
stituted or constructive service, or service by publica-
tion which is not made in strict compliance with tlw 
essential statutory requirements relating thereto in 
numerous cases cited in: 
49 Corpus Juris 63. 
A judgment based on service by publication 
is void where the requirements of the statute are 
not complied ~rith, with respect to the affida.vit 
for the order of publication. 
Butler v. ~fcKay, C.C.A. Cal. 138 F'. (2d) 373, 
certiorari denied 64 S. Ct. 636, 321 U.S. 780, 
88 L. Ed. 1073. 
Federal Farm Mortgage Corp. v. Schmidt. 126 
P. (2d) 1036, 109 Colo. 467. 
Robbins v. Lincoln ~rrace Christian Church, 
75 P. (2d) 874, 181 Okla. 615. 
Morgan v. Stevens, 223 P. 365, 101 Okla. 116. 
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Laughlin v. Hughes, 89 P. (2d) 568, 161 Or. 
295. 
Ray v. Pilot Fire Ins. Co., 121 F.E. 779. 
In order to support a default judgrnent, the defend-
ant must be served with due process or voluntarily 
appear. 
Glidden v. Pa.cka.rd, 28 Cal. 649. 
Street v. Dexter, 77 P. (2d) 707 (Okla.) 
Yutziz v. Hope, 158 P. (2d) 110. 
Okanogan State Bank v. Thompson, 211 P. 
993, 106 Or 44 7. 
If defendant is not sen·ed a default judgment taken 
against him is void· 
State Tax Com. v. Larsen, 100 Ut. 303, 110 P. 
(2nd) 558. 
Peterson v. Hutton, 284 P. 279, 132 Or. 252. 
And the same is true where the service on the de-
fendant is radically defective: 
Wilson v. Superior Court, 54 P. (2d) 539, 11 
Cal. A pp. ( 2d) 643. 
A judgment based upon constructive service upon a 
non-resident is void if the method of attempted notice 
to defendant is insufficient to constitute due process. 
Standish v. Standish, 40 N.Y.S. (2d) 538: 
"If the record on the whole shows what was 
done to acquire jurisdiction was insufficient, it 
will not be presumed that some other thing, not 
~hown hy the record, which would confer juris-
diction was done, the whole record being taken 
together for this purpose." 
21 C.J.S. p.156. 
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Where it appears ·from the record that the court 
was without jurisdiction, no presumption of jurisdic-
tion can be indulged, and the action of the court is void. 
21 t.J.S. p. 156, citing inter alia. 
Adolph v. Schwartz, 296 P. 508, 112 Cal. App. 
781. 
"So, the record of a court of general juris-
diction reciting that defendant has been duly 
served with process rnay be overthrown by other 
portions of the record of equal dignity showing 
that such recital is untrue." 21 C.J.S. pp. 4-14-
445. 
"The very reason for the affidavit is to make 
sure that every reasonable diligence to ascertain 
the whereabouts of the defendant has been made. 
If diligence or good faith in endeavoring to ascer-
tain the defendant's whereabouts is not employed. 
or if sufficient facts are not shown in the affi-
davit fron1 which it can be inferred that such 
diligence and good faith were ernployed, the judg-
ment is void on its face." (Justice Wolfe in 97 
Ut. 407.) 
For the foregoing reasons appellant respectfully 
submits that said default judgment in Civil Action No. 
2388 is void on its face; that the contrary holding of 
the court belo,v, together with its ruling that the same 
court and the same judge who granted the former judg-
rnent is without jurisdiction to set it aside, is again~t 
law. 
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POINT II. 
THE JUDGMENT IN CIVIL ACTION NUMBER 2388 
WAS OBTAINED BY FRAUD UPON THE COURT. 
The default judgment is not only void on its face, 
and for that reason constituted a fraud upon the court, 
but it is also shown by the allegations of fact set forth 
in appellant's cross-con1plaint (which are necessarily 
admitted by respondent's motion for summary judg-
ment) that said judgment was obtained by fraud upon 
the court and its processes and upon appellant. 
The proof of this fraud, in addition to the face of 
the record with its earmarks of fraud already shown, 
is that the order for publication of sum1nons was pro~ 
cured by a wilfully false and fraudulent affidavit for 
the purpose of preventin-g appellant from knowing of 
the existence of said action and fron1 appearing therein 
and defending his title to his land. 
That affidavit is wilfully false and misleading, and 
fraudulent, in that it states: 
''Person service thereon (Summons) cannot 
be had-that affiant, for the purpose of finding 
said defendant, has made diligent search and 
inquiry in the State of Utah, and has checked the 
records of both to determine the last address of 
the defendant, and finds that his last address 
was: Culbert L. Olson-unknown." 
Now here did the affiant in said affidavit find in 
any records in the State of Utah that appellant's last 
known address was given as "ttnknown." 
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At the time when the first action was prepared and 
filed the plaintiff and his attorney, who swore to the 
false statement in the affidavit, as well as the clerk of 
the court, had convenient 1neans of knowing the place 
of residence and the exact postoffice address of appel-
lant. The assessment rolls in the offices of the County 
Assessor and County Treasurer of Uintah County, next 
door to the office of the Clerk, showed plainly, with 
reference to the record title and assessment and payment 
of taxes on said land, both appellant's name and his 
exact postoffice address in the City of Los Angeles, 
State of California, the same as that published in the 
telephone and city directories of Los Angeles since 1929 
and prior thereto. 
Appellant since 1901 has been, and still is, a member 
of the Bar of Utah; and since prior to 1925 he has been 
and still is a member of the Bar of California. 
Appellant was a member of the Utah State Senate 
from January 1917 to January 1921, and was a member 
of the California State Senate from January 1935 to 
January 1939; and in 1938 appellant was elected Gov-
ernor of California and remained Governor for four 
years (January 1939-January 1943). This fact was 
widely published in the daily and weekly newspapers 
of Utah, including daily papers of wide circulation in 
Uintah County, and appellant's place of residence wa~ 
known to the affiant when in his affidavit he swore that 
the whereabouts of Culbert L. Olson was "unknown." 
Independent of the records of Uintah County, any 
good faith inquiry by any person seeking service of 
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summons on appellant would have readily disclosed his 
exact place of residence and his exact postoffice address. 
The plaintiff, in Action No. 2388, and his attorney who 
made the affidavit, (in ascertaining their own reasons 
for bringing the first action), must have known appel-
lant's place of residence and must have ascertained his 
exact postoffice address, just as respondent's attorneys 
knew it in bringing this second action and making per-
sonal service on appellant at his same postoffice address 
in Los Angeles. 
Plaintiff's attorney in the first action was careful 
not to place the summons in the hands of the sheriff 
or of anyone else for the purpose of ascertaining appel-
lant's place of residence, or for the purpose of making 
a return thereon. He was careful not to make inquiry 
of any person in public or private life in or outside of 
the State of Utah; and, if he did so, he suppressed 
giving the name of the person or persons of whom he 
made inquiry, or of the person or persons' response to 
his inquiry. The affiant was careful not to mention in 
his affidavit what "diligent search and inquiry" he made; 
and he was careful not to mention what record he "check-
ed" ; and, of course, he was careful not to mention in his 
affidavit the fact that he, himself, knew appellant's place 
of residence without making any inquiry. 
These indisputable facts (admitted by respondent's 
motion for summary judgment) constitute a fraud upon 
the court through the abuse of its judicial processes; a 
fraud perpetrated for the single and sole purpose of 
obtaining a default judgment against appellant by mak-
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ing certain that appellant would not be personally served 
with summons. 
Intent to deceive is usually proved by inference, 
rather than by direct evidence : 
Bell v. Graham (Cal.), 105 A.C.A. 938, 234 
P. (2d) 158. 
As the court moderately stated the point in Lieb-
hardt v. Lawrence, supra (Utah, p. 262): 
"Upon the evidence, we do not say that the 
conduct of the defendant was such as to prevent 
notice to the plaintiff of the prior proceeding. 
But his conduct is more in harmony with that 
theory than with that of reasonable efforts to 
give plaintiff such notice." 
Had the court in the first proceeding been fully 
advised in the premises of the facts set forth in appel-
lant's cross-complaint herein it must be assumed that the 
court would not have assumed jurisdiction to enter a 
default judgment against appellant without due process. 
For it is well established that: 
"* * * in a civil case a court will not take 
jurisdiction based on a service of process on a 
defendant who was brought within the reach of 
its process wrongfully or fraudulently, or by 
deceit, or by any other improper device.'' 
21 Corpus Juris Sec., Sect. 83, p. 124. 
See: Wyman v. Newhouse, C.C.A., N.Y. 93 
F. (2d) 313, 115 A.L.R. 460, certiorari denied 
58 S. Ct. 831, 303 U.S. 664, 82 L. Ed. 1122. 
Nicholson v. Gulf Mobile & Northern Rly. 
Co., 172 So. 306, 308, quoting Corpus Juri~. 
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To paraphrase this Court's language in In Re 
Waters, (1941) 100 Utah 246, which is so apt and sig-
nificantly identical on principle to this case that the cross-
complaint herein is good as against a n1otion for sum-
mary judgment (a demurrer in Waters case) : "It is 
obvious * * * that the facts set forth therein are suffi-
cient to show that the court acquired ho jurisdiction" 
to grant_ the decree quieting title'. ··If it lacked juris-
diction, the decree was a nullity." 
If the judgment's voidness is not self-revealed as 
appellant contends it is under Point I, appellant's plead-
ings set out exactly and with particularity wherein the 
judgment is void as a fraud upon the court, satisfying 
every requirement pronounced and followed by this 
Honorable Court in numerous decisions. 
Liebhardt v. Lawrence, 40 Ut. 243; 120 P. 
215; 
Intermill v. Nash, 94Ft. :271, 75 P. (:Zd) 161; 
In re Waters, supra; 
Weyant et al v. Utah Savings & Trust Co., 
54 l~tah 181, at 201, 205, 212; 182 P. 189. 
In the Weyant case, supra, this Court said : 
.. \Ve are presented with a case, therefore, 
where the fraud is not only extrinsic, but where 
it operated directly upon the court as well as up-
on the respondents; that is, the administratrix 
merely used the court as an Instrumentality by 
1ueans of which she gained her end, namely, to 
acquire the property belonging to respondents 
through legal forms." 
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The facts stated in appellant's cross-complaint con-
stitutes an obvious fraud upon the court. It would be 
needless to argue or labor the point were it not for the 
lower court's apparent misconception of it. 
The mere typing of the affidavit for the order for 
publication of sumn1ons is not the fraud. The fraud i~ 
swearing falsely and stating as a conclusion what i:-
demonstrably false, and therefore no evidentiary and 
probative facts supporting it; so that there is nothing 
upon which a court or its clerk can act in compliance 
with the Statute relating to service of summons on a 
non-resident defendant 
There is a reason for the insufficiency and inherent 
falseness of the affidavit. There is a reason for the omis-
sion of evidentiary and probative facts to show "dili-
gence." The reason is-and appellant has sworn to the 
fact in his pleadings and offered to prove it-that the 
affiant knew where appellant was and where he could be 
mailed a copy of the summons and con1plaint. Certainly 
the withholding of this knowledge to avoid a personal 
service on appellant must be held to be a fraud upon the 
court. 
POINT III. 
APPELLANT'S CROSS-COMPLAINT IS A DIRECT AT-
TACK ON THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT IN CIVIL ACTION 
NO. 2388. 
A. 
APPELLANT'S ATTACK ON THE JUDGEMENT IS COMPULSORY 
UNDER RULE 13 (a) AND WOULD BE PERMISSIVE UNDER RULE 13 (b), 
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U.R.C.P., IF IT COULD BE CONSIDERED AS A COLLATERAL ATTACK 
UNDER ANY PREVIOUS UTAH STATUTE OR DECISION. 
In bringing this second action to quiet title against 
appellant, this time by due process of law, and by decid-
ing not to stipulate to the invalidity of the prior default 
judgment as proof of alleged title, respondents raised 
that issue in the case and introduced into evidence the 
judgment roll in the fonner action on the strength of 
which they n1oved for sumn1ary judginent on the ground 
accepted by the court, that appellant's cross-complaint 
is a "mere collateral attack" on said judgment. 
Before showing, under the decisions of this Court 
prior to the effective date of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, (Jan. 1, 1950), that appellant's cross-com-
plaint would not be held to be a collateral attack on the 
judgment, but a direct attack, the question as to whether 
under the new rules it makes any difference whether a 
cross-claim attacking a judgment is in form a direct or 
collateral attack. 
Rule ·13 (b) provides: 
''Permissive Counterclaim. A pleading ma.y 
state as a counter-claim any clai1n against an 
opposing party not arising out of the transaction 
or occurrence that is the subject Inatter of the 
opposing party's claim." 
The Note to Rule 13 (b) states that this new rule 
contains a broader provision than the Utah Code 104-9-
:2 defining a counter-claim. 
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Rule 13 (a) defining compulsory co'ltnter-claim pro-
vides: 
~'A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any 
claim which at the time of serving the pleading 
the pleader has against any opposing party, if it 
arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is 
the subject matter of the opposing party's claim 
and does not require for its adjudication the pres-
ence of third parties of whom the court cannot 
acquire jurisdiction," etc. 
Under either of the foregoing applicable rules of 
pleading, the distinction drawn between a direct and 
a collateral attack on a judgment would appear to be 
abolished as to form at least. 
Any claim against an opposing party may be set up 
by way of a counterclaim whether or not it arises out of 
the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter 
of the opposing party's claim of title. That must include 
the claim against the opposing party in this action to 
have the prior judg1nent declared void in whatever form 
the same 1nay be pleaded. 
Appellant shall proceed, however, to consider the 
ground stated in respondent's motion for sumn1ary judg-
ment that appellant's cross cmnplaint must be disre-
garded as a collateral attack on the judgment, as though 
the motion had been made prior to the adoption of these 
new rules of procedure. 
B. 
APPELLANT'S ATTACK UPON THE PRIOR JUDGMENT IS PROVEN 
TO HAVE BEEN DIRECT BY RESPONDENTS' MOTION AND THE COURT'S 
RULING THEREON. 
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Appellant's cross-cmnplaint seeks to annul or obli-
terate the prior default judgrnent for the reasons here-
inbefore stated under Points I and II. The object and 
clear purpose of this pleading is to seek relief fron1 a 
void judgment obtained by fraud and withuot due pro-
eess. It cannot be classified as a n1ere atternpt to avoid 
the incidental effect of the judgment, because if it were 
a valid judgn1ent. the issue of title would be foreclosed. 
To hold that the prior judg1nent bec~une involved in this 
case only incidentally in consequence of which appel-
lant's cross-complaint is a m~re collateral attack contra-
dicts the trial court's judgn1ent which reposes on this 
untenable ground. Nevertheless, the trial court accepted 
fully respondents' specious argument in their brief in 
support of their n1otion wherein they said that appel-
lant's cross-con1plaint "is only incidental to his request 
that his title be quieted in this action against plaintiffs," 
which inaccurate statement of fact and law is contrary 
to the Court's definition of a collateral attack in the 
lntermill case, supra, where a collateral attack is defined 
as one in which : 
"The judgment is or becon1es involved in the 
cause, only incidentally and collaterally and its 
enforcPJncnt or ralidity is not the primary issue 
in and impelling 1mrpose of the proceeding." 
( En1phasis adcied.) 
The trial court's granting of respondents' n1otion 
for summary judgment conclusively proves that the 
enforcement of the forn1er default judgment and its 
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validity was not only the primary issue in the case but 
became the only issue in the trial court's opinion. Re-
spondents' pleadings clairn title by virtue of said judg-
ment, and respondents' motion, followed by their intro-
duction of the judginent roll in the former action into 
evidence conclusively demonstrates that their "impelling 
purpose" in this case is to establish the alleged validity 
of the prior judgment and enforce it. 
Respondents, in their brief in support of their mo-
tion, stated : 
"This present action was not brought for the 
primary object of modifying, setting aside, can-
celling or vacating, or enjoining the enforcement 
of the judgment. It was brought originally as an 
action to quiet title." 
To which respondents shmtld have added: 
"In reliance upon the former default decree 
which is conclusive of all issues of title, provided 
it is not void." 
The summary judgment granted by the lower court 
in response to respondents' motion is undeniably an ad-
judication that there were no other issues to be tried 
and that the validity of the prior judgment is the pri-
mary issue. Appellant's cross complaint attacking that 
judgment cannot, therefore, be a collateral attack under 
the law of Utah. To quote Justice Wolfe in the Intermill 
case: 
··~' ~, * 'Ye are interested rnore in the m~nner 
of testing in any given case whether a judgment 
may be attacked than in nomenclature * * *" 
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c. 
APPELLANT'S CROSS·COMPLAINT CONSTITUTES A DIRECT ATTACK 
0~ THE PRIOR DEFAULT DECREE AS A MATTER OF LAW AND EQUITY. 
As a matter of law, appellant refers to Justice 
\\rolfe's concurring opinion in the case of lntermill v. 
Nash, supra, which would seem to be in accord with 
Rules 13 (a) and (b) U.R.C.P., hereinabove referred to: 
.. As, says the prevailing opinion, generally 
a direct attack is one, the purpose of which is to 
eli1ninate what is or purports to be a judgment, 
whereas a collateral attack atten1pts, not to obli-
terate a judg~nent, but to avoid the effect of it 
when used in another suit. But I think there is 
a form of direct attack which really only avoids 
the effect of a purported jttdgment. In order to 
make this 1nore clear, I list the types of direct at-
tacks as I see then1 : 
"(1) That attack which atten1pts to set 
aside a judgment by motion or proceeding 
brought in the ~ame suit in which the judgment 
was rendered. 
"(:Z) A (separate) suit brought and de-
signed directly to set aside a voidable judgment 
or what is not a judgment but which purports to 
be one in other words, a void judgment . 
.. ( 3) Where a party brings a suit or de-
fends a suit relying for recovery or for a defense 
on what purports to be a judgment rendered in 
another suit, the opposing party 1nay show such 
judgment to ve void. 
"If one brings a suit on a contract, the other 
party may show the contract invalid. For the 
same reason, I see no reason why, in a suit based 
on a purported judg1nent or defended on the 
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strength of a supposed judgment which is null, 
it may not be avoided in the same suit in which 
such judg1nent is to be introduced and used by 
laying the proper foundation for introduction 
of evidence of the voidness of the supposed judg-
ment. * * * In this case, it was necessary to go 
outside of the judgment roll by the introduction 
in evidence of an affidavit of jurisdictional facts 
claimed to be deficient in order to prove the judg-
ment void. This could not be done without such 
pleadings as would be required in an independ-
ent action to set aside the judgment." (Emphasis 
added.) 
In the light of the foregoing statement it must be 
admitted that appellants' cross-complaint is an "inde-
pendent action" to set aside a judgment directly, and 
not collaterally. 
In support of appellant's position, the Court's atten-
tion is again directed to In re Waters, supra, (Utah p. 
251): 
"That a collateral attack upon the divorce 
decree is atte1npted is not, in view of the allega-
tions of the petition, grounds for sustaining the 
demurrer and dismissing the cause. The petition 
sets out the insufficiency of the affidavit for pub-
lication of sun1n1ons. Such affidavit and the order 
made pursuant thereto are part of the judgment 
roll. Sec. 104-30-14, R.S. 1933. Su.ch was not the 
case when the decision of this Court in Liebhardt 
v. Lawrence, 40 Utah 243, 120 P. 215, was ren-
dered. Therein, the Court, at page 256 of 40 
Utah, at page 220 of 120 P., said: 
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·· 'This Court has already held that an 
affidavit and an order for publication of 
sumnwns, not being a part of the judgment 
roll and of the reeord, will not on a collateral 
attack, be inquired into, and that a Court, on 
such an attack, will not look outside the re-
cord itself to ascertain whether they were 
properly n1ade or filed, but will indulge the 
presu1nption that they were all that the law 
required. Citing Amy v. Amy, 12 Utah 278, 
+:2 P. 1121; Hoagland v. Hoagland, 19 Utah, 
103, 37 P. 20.' 
··Under the implicati.ons of the Liebhardt 
ca8e, the allegations of the petition before the 
lou·er court were perhaps sufficient to stttstain 
a collateral attack on the divorce decree.'' (Em-
phasis added.) 
The Court then significantly adds : 
.. ,Ve are not, however, disposed to hold that 
in such a proceeding as this, petitioner should be 
trannnelled by the rules relative to collateral 
attacks on a judgment. That a s1tit in equ.ity to 
. .:;pt aside a decree on the ground of want of juris-
diction in the Court rendering it or on the ground 
of fra11d is a direct attack thereon is settled 
doctrine in this State. Liebhardt v. Lawrence, 
...;ltpra. 
"Where the death of a party, whose alleged 
fraud upon the Court cheated his adversary of 
her day in Court, precludes the latter from lnain-
taining a suit to set aside the decree, the same 
latitude should be allowed as in such suit, to 
Pstablish, in a proceeding in his estate, a right 
purportedly cut off hy the allegedly void decree. 
The ag,qrie~·ed party .-,1wuld be permitted to show 
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to the Court the facts relative to such lack of 
jurisdiction or fraud as would be permitted in 
any direct attack on the judgment." (Emphasis 
added). 
The decision and opinion in the Waters case should 
eliminate any possible question as to whether appellant's 
cross-cmnplaint is a collateral or a direct attack, because 
it makes no difference by which nan1e it is called. In the 
language of Justice Straup in the Liebhardt case, supra, 
any distinction in terms is : 
"* * * groundless, and is based on a miscon-
ception of what may be directly and what col-
laterally attacked." 
This point, inasmuch as it is referred to as a ground 
of the trial court's judgment in this case, has been so 
thoroughly resolved in Liebhardt v. Lawrence, supra, 
that the court's opinion in that case is adopted by appel-
lant as a most convenient argument against the trial 
court's finding that appellant's cross-complaint is a 
"mere" collateral attack upon the judgn1ent in the prior 
action. Except as the law was changed to include the 
affidavit and order for publication of summons as part 
of the judgment roll (In re Waters, supra), which ren-
ders the prior judgn1ent void on its face (Appellant's 
Point I), the Liebhardt case controls the question of 
collateral attack. That case and the case at bar are 
as identical as two cases can be, involving as they do, 
almost identical facts and questions of law. 
Also, in Weyant et al. v. Utah Savings & Trust Co., 
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supra, 54 r tah at p. 205, the Court held that an attack 
upon a judgment charging fraud is a direct attack. 
In the Weyant case, the Court said (Utah p. 205): 
··When the respondents learned that they 
had been despoiled of their inheritance, and under 
the established rules of law and procedure they 
could obtain no redress by direct appeal from 
the decree of distribution in the probate proceed-
ings, they were driven to seek redress in some 
other proceeding and by an attack upon the 
decree, provided they could establish the type of 
fraud which authorized such an attack (Point II, 
this brief) namely, extrinsic fraud. Under the 
authorities already referred to, such an attack, 
in this jurisdiction, is a direct attack." 
Appellant's proof, pleadings and offer of proof 
thereunder do not constitute a collateral attack upon 
the prior default judgn1ent, but a direct attack in accord-
ance "·ith the controlling law a~ stated in the foregoing 
Utah decisions. 
Appellant's true and proper defense to respondents' 
present action to quiet title necessarily involves his 
counterclailn pleading facts showing that a default judg-
ment on which respondent relies is not only void on its 
face but 'va~ obtained by fraud upon the Court. (Inter-
mill v. Xash, supra). 
Appellant can "see no reason why, in a suit based 
on a purported judgn1ent * * * it 1nay not be avoided 
in the ~ame suit in which such judgn1ent is to be intro-
duced and used by laying the proper foundation for 
introduction of evidence of the voidness of the supposed 
:( jndgJ.nent." (.Justice Wolfe in lntermill v. Nash, supra). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
74 
The institution of respondents' second action to 
quiet title should estop them from objecting to appel-
lant's pleading and proof of a legal and equitable coun-
terclaim raising a triable issue involving the validity 
of a default judgment. in the first action upon which 
they admittedly rely, and which issue must of necessity 
be primarily involved in any final adjudication of title. 
If the record does not disclose the jurisdictional 
defect the judgment is voidable : 
Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commission, 22 
P. (2d) 1046, 1048, 82 Utah 179. 
And extrinsic evidence is admissible to show tlw 
jurisdictional defect: 
Campbell v. Aderhold, C.C.A. Ga., 67 F. (2d) 
246. 
O'Donohue v. Boies, 53 N.E. 537, 159 N.Y. 87. 
It is to be observed that in their answer to appel-
. lant's final cross-complaint, respondents admit and plead 
the forn1er judgment in paragraph 2 of their Fourth 
Defense, pp. 2 and 3 : 
"Cross-defendants admit that they clai.In title 
and ownership interests in said land under and 
by virtue of said default judgment referred to in 
the allegation of Paragraph 2 of said cross-com-
plaint, but deny that cross-defendants' title and 
ownership interests in said land rest solely upon 
said default judgment * * * and * * * allege that 
their ownership and possession are based 11pou 
other meritorious rights and claims." 
(Answer To Cross-complaint Amending And 
Replacing Third Amended Cross-complaint. 
supra, p. 26). (Emphasis added). 
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E 
Appellant's Cross-cornplaint Is An Independ-
ent Action In Equity Brou-ght To Annul Or 
Facate The Judgment In Action No. 2388 .Upon 
Equitable (As Well As Legal Grounds) As Fu.lly 
::Jet Forth In Said Cross-complaint. 
(Section 60 (b) U.R.C.P. 1950) . 
.. An action in equity, brought to annul the 
judgn1ent or set aside or vacate the same, alleg-
ing proper equitable grounds therefor, whether 
by plaintiff in his complaint or counterclaim or 
hy defendant in a. proper proceeding, is a direct 
attack on the judgment." Intermill v. Nash, supra, 
citing: 
Liebhardt v. Lau-rence, 40 Utah 2-13, 120 P. 
:215; 
Riddle v. Q1tinn, 32 l-;-tah 341, 90 P. 893; 
Wilson v. Hawthorne, 1-1 Colo. 530, :2-1 P. 548; 
Leu in v. Gladstem, 1-12 N.C. 482, 32 L.R.A. 
~ ew Series 905, note ; 
Halleck v. Laft, 19 Colo. 7-1,34 P. 568; 
Fallette v. Pac. Light d!; Power Corp., 189 
Cal. 193, :208 P. :295, 23 L.R.A. 965; 
Acton v. Lamberson, 102 Ore. -172, 202 P. -1:21, 
73:2; 
Xorthu·estern & Pac. Hypotheck Bank v. Red-
path, 29 \Vash. 687, 70 P. 1392. 
In the Intermill case, the Court says: 
.. She (plaintiff) comn1enced the action as the 
~implest forn1 of suit to quiet title, without any 
mention of the decree through which the defend-
ant deraigns title. Defendant, in like manner, 
eounterclaims to quiet title in her, without plead-
ing the judgment or referring thereto, etc." 
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"* * * Some basis must be laid in an attack 
upon a judgment on matters de hors the record, 
showing that if the allegations so laid are true, 
the judgment must be void (Appellant's Point 
II). In this _case, there is no such allegation. 
It is evident, therefore, that there are no plead-
ings making an attack upon the judgment, or to 
open the way for evidence de hors the record 
as to its validity * * *." "Any question, there-
fore, as to jurisdiction (Appellant's Point I), 
or, as to the validity of the judgment (Appel-
lant's Point II) which does not show upon the 
face of the record must be raised and brought 
to the attention of the court by appropriate pro-
ceedings." (Emphasis added). 
And: 
"There is nothing appearing in the decree 
or the deed to suggest or indicate a question as 
to their validity ; * * *" 
The Court points out, however, that: 
"The affidavit of jurisdictional facts for 
publication of summons was not, in 1929, a part 
of the judgment roll, * * * and, therefore, is 
probably not even evidence for inspection as 
part of the judgment roll," which, however, ap-
pellant hastens to add, is not and was not true 
when the affidavit was made in action No. 2388 
in 1946."* 
See: In re Waters, supra and infra. 
In the case of Doyle v. West Temple Terrace Com-
pany, 43 Utah 277, 135 P. 105, at p. 105, the Court says: 
"In an action to quiet title to real estate, 
a plaintiff may assail a judgment, deed or any 
other instrument affecting his title, for the reason 
that such judgment or instruments are void, on 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I~ 
~: 
1' 
'~ ' 
77 
the ground of fraud or for any other legal reason. 
The prin1ary purpose of such an action is to 
destroy or canrel the prin1a facie or apparent 
effect of such judgment or instruments, and to 
quiet the title to the real estate which is appar-
ently clouded or affected thereby. If a judgment 
is assailed in such action, the action is a direct 
and not a callateral attack upon the judg1nent. 
For cases directly in point, see: 
Jlosby v. Gisborn, 17 Utah :257-283, 5± P. 12t; 
Parsons v. lVeiss, 1±± Cal. 410, 77 P. 1007; 
Dunlap v. Steere, 92 Cal. 344, 28 P. 563; 
Bledsoe v. Price & Co., 132 Ala. 621, 32 So. 
325; 
JJ cCampbell v. Dtttrst, 73 Tex. 419, 11 S.W. 
380; 
Eichoff v. Eichojf, 107 Cal. 42, 40 P. 24; 
Freeman on Jtttdgments (3rd Ed. 485); 
Weyant et al. v. Utah Savings & Trust Co., 
54 rtah 181, at 201, 205, 212; 182 P. 189; 
Liebhardt v. Lawrence, 40 Utah :Z-!3, 120 P. 
:215." 
In Liebhardt v. LawrencP, supra, the Court declared, 
at page 259 of 40 l~tah: 
Defects in the service of su1nn1ons 1nay be 
assailed in a direct proceeding on grounds other 
than jurisdiction. That is, the service though de-
fective, may nevertheless be sufficient to confer 
jurisdiction, and yet may, on a direct proceeding, 
be successfully assailed on other grounds. We 
think that is true here. The defect here is one 
of ~ervice. That defect, as already suggested, 
is not that the fact of non-residence was not 
averred, but that a copy of the summons and 
cmnplaint was not 1nailed; and that no facts or 
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circu1nstances are stated, found, or made to 
appear to excuse such failure. In dealing with 
that question, we think the place of residence 
of a non-resident defendant is very material. 
The law abhors and forbids the taking of proper-
ty from a person without notice and without his 
day in Court. To proceed against and deal with 
a thing within the jurisdiction of the Court, and 
subject to the Court's seizure and control, the 
statute provides for a constructive service on a 
non-resident by a publication of summons. But 
the intent and spirit of. the statute, in such case, 
as well requires a copy of the summons and 
complaint to be mailed to him, if his place of 
residence is known. This is a wholesome provi-
sion and is not to be ignored. It ought to be 
complied with. It is itself a part of the serv-
ice* * *." 
"Upon a presentation of an affidavit for a 
publication of the summons on the ground of a 
non-resident defendant, both the plaintiff in the 
action and the clerk have duties to perform: The 
plaintiff, by affidavit, to furnish the clerk the 
evidence in respect of the fact that the defend-
ant is a non-resident; the clerk, upon the evidence 
so adduced, to determine that the defendant is 
a non-resident and to direct or order a publica-
tion of the summons. But there the duties do 
not end. The statute further requires that, 'where 
the residence of a non-resident or absent defend-
ant is known;' the clerk shall mail hi1n a copy of 
the summons and complaint." 
The Court then continues (p. 260): 
"What do the words 'is known' mean~ Known 
to whom? Personally known to the clerk~ Per-
sonally known to the plaintiff, or to the affiant 
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making the affidavit on his behalf 1 Certainly 
not. They do and can only mean if the place of 
residence of the non-resident can, by reasonable 
diligence or inquiry, be discovered, be ascertajn-
ed, be found." 
And, (on p. 261): 
"Non-residents, as well as residents, have 
the right to acquire and hold property in the 
State. In the absence of proof of actual service, 
proceedings affecting them properly require care-
ful scrutiny; and the Court, before entering a 
iudgment taking it from them and giving it to 
anotlzer, should see to it that not only one, but 
that e1.:ery reqttirement of the statute providing 
for a constructive service has, both in letter 
and spirit, been strictly complied with * * *" 
( En1phasis added). 
And (pp. 261-262): 
""Here con1es a litigant into Court by a pro-
ceeding affecting the property of a non-resident 
who for many years had the record title, except 
as his rights thereto may have been diverted by 
the tax sale, and seeks to take it from him, and 
to claim it for himself. He caused an affidavit to 
be filed by an agent that the non-resident 'resides 
out of the State of Utah, and that his place of 
residence is to the affiant unknown,' without 
even stating that the place of residence is un-
knmvn to the litigant. The clerk manifests no 
concern about it, and on the affidavit alone 
directs and causes the summons to be published, 
not in a 'newspaper designated as the most likely 
to give notice to the person to be served,' but 
in a weekly periodical least likely to give such 
notice. There the 1natter rests, a'vaiting the time 
to take the default. X o effort and no inquiry is 
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rnade to ascertain or to discover the place of 
plaintiff's residence (in the case at bar it was 
known to affiant). The fact of the place of resi-
dence was regarded as wholly ilnrnaterial, and 
that all that was necessary to know was that the 
plaintiff was a non-resident. Hence, no copy of 
the summons and complaint was mailed to him, 
and no effort made to do so. Upon such a serv-
ice, plaintiff's (cross-complainant's) property is 
taken from hiln, and is given to the defendant 
(cross-defendant)." 
And, (p. 262): 
"We do not think such a service, as against 
a direct att.ack, is good, when it is made to appear, 
as here, that the defendant's knowledge (the 
plaintiff in the former action) of the place of 
residence of the non-resident was negative, and 
where, as here, he had ready and convenient 
means of knowledge of such fact; and that upon 
reasonable diligence and inquiry such place could 
readily have been discovered and ascertained, 
and a copy of the summons and complaint mailedn 
(Emphasis added). 
Under these authorities there can be no doubt that 
appellant's cross-c01nplaint is a direct attack upon the 
prior default judgment. 
There can likewise be no doubt that the prior judg-
ment is void as a fraud upon the court (Appellant'~ 
Point II) and that under appellant's direct attack the 
judgment roll rnay be examined to prove the facts alleged 
in appellant's cross-complaint under Rule 60 (b) U.R.C.P. 
Appellant's cross-complaint is clearly "an action 
in equity, brought to annul the judgment, or set aside 
or vacate the same" (Doyle v. West Temple Terrace 
Co., supra). 
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Where a judgtnent is pleaded as a defense to an 
action, a party ( cross-con1plainant herein) has a right 
to challenge and have the court pass on the validity of 
the judgment and the proceedings under which it was 
obtained. 
St. Louis San Francisco Rwly. Co. v. Boyne, 
40 P. (2d) 1104, 170 Okl. 542; 
Southern Pine Lmnber Co. v. Ward, 85 P. 
459, 16 Okl. 131. 
_\ppellant was required to plead the facts set forth 
in his answer and cross-complaint: 
lntermill v. Nash, supra; 
O'Quinn v. Tate, Tex. Civ. App., 187 S.\V. (2d) 
241,49 C.J.S., p. 828. 
It is thus beyond question that the court below 
refused to follow the controlling law of Utah in holding 
that appellant's appropriate and indispensable plead-
ings are a collateral attack upon the former judgment, 
even though, for the purpose of respondents' motion 
at least, all appellant's aver1nents of fact have to be 
deemed true, and those averments demonstrate the in-
validity of the judgment, tacitly admitted by respond-
ents having brought this second suit to quiet the,ir al-
leged title 
The record herein clearly demonstrates that the 
proce:-:~ by which plaintiff procured a default judg1nent 
in the earlier action made it ilnpossible for defendant-
appellant to receive notice of that action or of the 
judgment rendered therein. It is certainly not unreason-
able to infer from the invalid process and the invalid 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
82 
tax deed what induced respondents to file their second 
suit to quiet title. It cannot be doubted that the insuffi-
cient, void and ambiguous affidavit, stating no juris-
dictional facts, but inherently false as appellant has 
offered to prove, fails to conform with statutory re-
quirements or to furnish a jurisdictional basis for the 
first or second (summary) judgment. The order for 
publication of summons pursuant to the defective, false 
and unauthorized affidavit amounted to no service of 
process at all. For that very clear reason there was a 
total lack of jurisdiction, even as to form, appearing 
on the face of the record and the decree can, therefore, 
be in1peached collaterally (Point I). Such a want of 
jurisdiction cannot be supplied by a play on words, 
or by looking to pure form and trying to sharply. dis-
tinguish that which needs no differentiation in this 
case, namely, whether appellant's pleadings constitute 
a "direct" or "collateral" attack upon the void judgment 
upon which even respondents admit they would not 
wholly rely in the present action (Stipulation, supra, 
p. 8). 
POINT IV. 
THE CAUSE OF ACTION SET FORTH IN APPEL-
LANT'S CROSS-COMPLAINT IS NOT (A) BARRED BY 
RULE 60 (b) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCED-
URE, 1950, OR (B) BY LACHES. 
(A) 
Appellant's cross-complaint was manifestly not a 
motion under Rule 60 (b), (1) (2) (3) or (4) U.H.C.P .. 
but an "independent action." 
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Rule 60 (b) is substantially the same as Sections 
104-14-4 of the former Utah Code of Civil Procedure: 
.. With some deletions, and with the addition 
of a subdivision 4 relating to setting aside a 
judgment wh~re the party was not personally 
served, * * ., 
and relates to motions made in the smne case in which 
the judgment was entered, and then expressly provides 
that: 
"This rule does not limit the power of a 
Court to entertain an independent action to re-
liet·e a party from a judgment, order or proceed-
i-ng or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon 
the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief 
from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed 
by these rules or by an independent action." 
(Emphasis added). 
Rule 60 (b) specifically providing for an independent 
action, such as appellants cross-complaint to set aside 
a judgment void on its face or for fraud upon the court, 
recognizes the universally established right to equitable 
relief from such a judgn1ent without lilnit as to ti1ne. 
"Any statutory limitation of the time within 
which an application to open or vacate a judg-
ment 1nay be made must be observed in all appli-
cations to open or vacate made under, or within 
the operation of the statute. Where, however, 
the application is not made under the statute, or 
on statutory grounds, but invokes the inherent 
power of the court, as discussed in Sec. 265, supra, 
the statutory limitation is generally deemed not 
applicable and the power to vacate a proper case 
is not lost by lapse of time or expiration of the 
term." 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
84 
49 C.J.S. 288 and cases cited: 
Liebhardt v. Lawrence, 40 Ut. 243, 120 Pac. 
215;. 
lntermill v. Nash, 75 Pac. 2d 161: 
Higgs v. Burton, 58 Utah 103; 
Doyle v. West Temple Terrace Co., 43 "Gt. 277, 
135 P. 103; 
Kramer v. Pixton, 72 Ut. 1. 
In Kramer v. Pixton, supra, the Court says: 
''In the final analysis the contention of re-
spondents is that appellant has had an adequate 
remedy in the original action by motion or some 
other proceeding therein to be relieved from the 
effects of the judgment rendered * * *" and say~ 
further that "there would be much force in that 
contention if it were not alleged in the complaint 
that the time limited by the statute within which 
appellant could move in the original case had 
expired. It is alleged in the amended complaint 
that appellant had no notice of the pendency of 
the action in the District Court of Utah County 
or judg1nent rendered therein until 30 days prior 
to the commencement of the present action and 
1nuch more than one year after the date of entry 
of such judgment. It is provided in Cmnp. Law~ 
Utah, 1917, Sec. 6619, in enumerating the di~­
cretionary powers of a District Court that : 
'When, frmn any cause, the summons in 
an action has not been served on the defend-
ant, the Court may allow on such terms a:-: 
1nay be just, such defendant or his legal 
representative, at any time within one year 
after the rendition of any judg1nent in such 
action, to answer to the merits of the original 
action.' -
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.. It thus appears frmn the allegations of the 
complaint that whatever ren1edy or right appel-
lant may have had to appear by motion in the 
original action was lost by lapse of time unless 
a Court of equity could and would entertain jur-
isdiction to restrain the enforcement of the judg-
lnent against him. Appellant is left without any 
remedy whatever and would of necessity see his 
property subjected to the payment of the judg-
ment rendered against him without having had 
his day in Court. It is axiomatic in the law that 
for every wrong there is a remedy." 
See also: In re Waters Estate, supra. 
Rule 60 (b) U.R.C.P. expressly au-thorizes an Inde-
pendent Action for or a. motion for equitable relief from 
a judgment. 
Rule 60 (b) provides that the court may "on mo-
tion" (made in the same action) and "upon such terms 
as are just" -"in the furtherance of justice" relieve a 
party-from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for 
the following re·asons * * * ( 3) fraud (whether hereto-
fore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresenta.-
tion" or other misconduct of an adverse party"; ( 4) 
where, for any cause, the smnmons in an action has not 
been personally served upon the defendant as required 
by Rule ( 4) (e) and the defendant has failed to a.ppe·ar 
in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judg-
ment has been satisfied * * * or it is no longer equitable 
that the judgment should have prospective application; 
( 7) or any other reason justifying relief from the opera-
tion of the judgment. 
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The 1notion shall be 1nade not more than three 
months after the judgment was entered if made for 
reasons of ( 1) 1nistake, inadvertence, surprise or excus-
able neglect or for (2) newly discovered evidenc-e, or (3) 
fraud, or ( 4) when sum1nons is not personally served 
on defendant as required b~- Rule 4 (e).* There is no 
time limit within u:hich a party nwy even by motion 
made in the same action seek relief from a ( 5) void 
judgment, other than "a reasonable time," or (6) u-lz.ere 
"it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have 
prospective application" or ( 7) "where there is any other 
reason justifying relief front the operation of the stat-
ute." 
*Rule 4 (e) relates to personal service wi·thin this State. 
Rule 4 (f) relates to service of summons on non-residents. 
The note to this code provision states, in part: ''As 
applied to a final order or judgment this rule is sub-
stantially the same as our Code 104-14-4." 
This rule, as it relates to relief from judg1nent by 
motion made in the smne action also provides (Pg. SS, 
U.R .. C.P.): 
"This rule does not limit the power of a 
Court to entertain an independent action to re-
lieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceed-
ing or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the 
court." 
"The procedure for obtaining 'any relief' 
from a judgn1ent shall be by motion as prescribed 
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in these rules or by an independent action." 
In view of the foregoing express provisions of Rule 
60 (b), and applicable decisional law, the trial court's 
finding that appellant's cross-cmnplaint is barred by that 
rule is plainly erroneous. 
(B) 
APPELLANT IS NOT GUILTY OF LACHES IN THE 
PREMISES. HIS CROSS-COMPLAINT CANNOT BE BAR-
RED ON THAT GROUND. 
On a motion to dismiss laches cannot be raised. 
Atl. Coast Line R. Co. v. Penn. R. Co., D.C. 
Pa. 12 Fed Sup. 720 (Rule 57 U.R.C.P. 
(Appellant's Point VI). 
But it could not be properly held in a trial of the 
facts and it is absured to assume in this proceeding 
that appellant is barred by laches. 
The record affirmatively shows that appellant, with-
in a reasonable ti1ne after service of process upon him 
in the present action, by making inquiry concerning 
the reason for the action, discovered the existence of 
the earlier default judgment and seasonably thereafter 
filed his cross-complaint herein directly attacking the 
default judgment as being void on its face and a fraud 
upon the court. 
To the extent that respondents delayed bringing 
this action and in failing to serve appellant with sum-
mons herein for a year after its commencement, they 
are themselves responsible for the delay of appellant 
in filing and presenting his eross-complaint directly at-
tacking the forrner default decree. Respondents com-
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1nenced this action on the 22nd day of September 1948, 
but service of process on appellant was not made until 
the 16th day of Septen1ber, 1949. Thereafter (follow-
ing the filing of his original answer to: respondents' 
complaint), appellant Inade inquiry of respondents a:' 
to the nature of respondents' claim to title to the land 
involved, by writing to plaintiff's counsel and asking 
him for an abstract of title which was promised but 
not furnished appellant until the 19th day of December 
1949. 
Thus, it is clear fron1 the record that appellant 
cannot properly be charged with unreasonable delay1 
or with laches, in filing his cross-complaint. 
Certainly a party is entitled to object to a default 
judgment procured by fraud upon the court andjor 
void on its face within a reasonable time after the dis-
covery of the existence of the judgn1ent and the fact:' 
constituting the fraud by bringing an independent action 
in equity to show the voidness of that judgment and that 
it would be inequitable to give such judgment prospective 
operation, or for ''any other reason justifying relief 
from the judgment" (Ru1e 60 (b) U.R.C.P.): and a 
judg~nent that is void on its face may be attacked at 
any time ( 49 C.J .S., Sect. 231, pg. 445). 
An independent action in equity instituted on No-
vember 19, 1936, to set aside a judgn1ent entered in a 
prior action on Septe1nber 30, 1931, on the ground of 
extrinsic constructive fraud or extrinsic mistake, \\·a~ 
not barred by laches where the facts constituting fraud 
or 1nistake were not discovered until August 11. 1936: 
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Antonssen v. Pacific Container Co., 48 Cal. 
App. 535, 120 P. (2d) 148. 
To same effect: 
Scott v. Dilke, 47 Cal. App. (2d) 207, 117 P. 
(2d) 700. 
Cross defendants (respondents) are estopped from 
pleading laches or the statute of limitations in this 
case: 
Adams v. Calif. 1lfutual Building & Loan 
A.ss'n., 18 Cal. (2d) 487, 116 P. (2d) 75. 
Under some persuasive authorities a judgment pro-
cured through fraud, collusion, deceit, or mistake 1nay 
be attacked at any time, on a proper showing: 
Stafford v. Stafford, 181 P. (2d) 491, 163 Kan. 
162; 
Zernnrray v. Kilgore, 177 So. 714, 130 Fla. 
317. 
Xeither the doctrine of laches nor the statute of 
limitations applies to an attack on a judgment void 
because of a want of jurisdiction, even though the attack 
he collateral, since there is no time li1niting an attack 
on a void judgment: 
Garrison v. Blanchard, 16 P. (2d) :273, 127 
Cal. App. 616. 
A fact apparent from the mandatory record, show-
ing that fundamental laws was disregarded in the estab-
lishment of the judgment, will render it null and void 
for all purposes: 
Stockyards National Bank v. Bragg, 245 P. 
966, 67 Utah 60. 
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Laches in attacking legal proceedings of which notice 
should have been given, cannot be imputed to the moving 
party if he was not notified: 
Great West Min. Co. v. Alston Min. Co., 20 
P. 771, 12 Colo. 46, 13 Am. S.R. 204: 
Burningham v. Burke, 245 P. 977, 67 Utah 90. 
In Burningham v. Burke, supra, the court held 
that: 
''Laches cannot be imputed to one who is 
ignorant of the fact and for that reason failed 
to assert her rights, and on such ground to bar 
relief against fraud. Laches must not only con-
sist of delay but of a delay which worked a dis-
advantage to the opposing party * * * ." 
In Hamilton v. DooZy, at page 773, the court state~: 
"* * * the instances seem to be rare where 
courts have declared that mere lapse of timt> 
might effect a positive bar, even in cases of 
purely equitable jurisdiction; while, on the other 
hand, relief has frequently been granted, not-
withstanding great delay, when substantial jus-
tice could yet be done between the parties." 
Also the court says : 
"What may be considered neglect in one 
case may be regarded as reasonable diligence in 
another. It does not appear that the controversy 
is seriously embarrassed by the loss of evidence 
or otherwise. Nor i~ it shown that the defend-
ant's rights have been prjudiced by the delay. 
The parties are about in the same situation a~ 
they were when the suit was com1nenced.'' 
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The doctrine of laches is not designed to punish a 
plaintiff, and can be invoked only where to allow a claim 
would, because of claimant's own acts, permit an unwar-
ranted injustice: 
McClelland v. Sha.w, 72 P. (2d) 225, 23 Cal. 
App. (2d) 107. 
"Moreover * * * the rule supported by the 
w'"eight of authority is. that delay in asse·rting 
a right does not of itself constitute lache,s." 
30 C.J.S., p. 531, citing: 
J!fary Jones Stevens Co. v. First Nat. Bldg. 
Co., 57 P. (2d) 1099, 80 Utah 456; 
Burningham v. Burke, supra; 
Bankers Trust Co. v. Riter, 206 P. 276, 60 
Utah 1. 
See: Openshaw v. Openshatc, 1-!-l: P. (2d) 
528, 105 Utah 574. 
Appellant duly answered respondent's complaint 
and prayed that his. own title be quieted long before he 
discovered the existence of said default judgment. Upon 
Pxamining abstract of title received from respondent's 
attorney on December 19, 1949, appellant filed his orig-
inal cross-complaint on J anuar~7 5, 1950. On 1\Iarch 27, 
1950 appellant filed his first runended cross-complaint, 
~pecifically attacking such judgment, when it appeared 
that respondent's counsel had decided not to stipulate 
that said judgment is void, after leading appellant to 
believe he would do ~o. (Stanley letter, p. 4; (R. 236) 
April 3, 1950). 
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The :t;ecord shows that respondents could not pos-
sibly have suffered any disadvantage from these facts. 
The record also shows that respondents' themselves and 
the lower court are responsible for unnecessary delays 
in the proceedings in this case. 
Y. 
THE RECORD IN THIS CASE DISPROVES THE ALLE-
GATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT IN ACTION NO. 2388 AND 
PROVES CONCLUSIVELY THAT APPELLANT HAS A 
MERITORIOUS DEFENSE THERETO AS WELL AS TO 
RESPONDENT'S COMPLAINT IN THIS SECOND ACTION. 
Respondent Bowen had no title to quiet in action 
No. 2388. The evidence (Abstract of Title) introduced 
by respondents, together '"rith the stipulation of record 
that Uintah County did not acquire legal title to the 
property involved and that the County's void quitclaim 
deed to Burns Hallet on September 22, 1943 and the 
latter's quitclaim to J. Parry Bowen on December 20, 
1945, show no title was conveyed to respondent Bowen. 
The record further shows that respondent Bowen could 
not have acquired title by adverse possession when 
Action No. 2388 was com1nenced or when the default 
judgment therein was obtained. 
The respondent Bowen comn1enced Action No. 2388 
on September 11, 1946, less than three years from 
September 2:2, 1943 when his predecessor, Burns Hallet, 
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acquired the void quitelailn deed from the County; and 
since the decree was entered N ovmnber 13, 1946, only 
three years and two Inonths had elapsed frmn the thne 
respondent's predecessor received the void deed frmn the 
County. 
If the statute of liinitations in which title by adverse 
possession could begin started frmn the tin1e a contract 
was made hy the County to quitclain1 to Burns Hallet 
and this contract was relied upon for color of title as 
indicated in )Ir. Stanley's letter to appellant ( Statmnent 
of Facts herein, p. 4), seven years had not elapsed 
before the default judgn1ent was taken against appel-
lant. The date of that contract was September 30, 1940 
(Abs. of Title). Action ~o. 2388 was comn1enced Sep-
tember 11, 1946, and the default judgment entered there-
in, 'vas signed X ovember 13, 1946, and is marked filed, 
Koven1ber 29, 1946, less than the seven years required 
to establish title by adverse possession. 
Thus, the record before the court shows that no 
evidence of title existed to support the former default 
judgment and the pleadings show that appellant was 
the owner of the and involved when the default judgment 
was taken against him ; also that he still ren1ains the 
owner thereof unless the sunnnary judgment appealed 
from is pern1itted to deprive hin1 of his ownership. 
~\ppellant's answer and cross-cmnplaint (which re-
~pondents' motion for smnmary judgment adn1its), and 
the testiinony of appellant's witness Johnson, taken out 
of order, show actual and continuous possession of the 
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property h~' appellant and that neither respondent 
Bowen, nor Hallet, occupied the land or any part there-
of prior to the entry of said default judgment; and that 
none of the respondents in this action have ever oceupied 
said land or any part thereof. 
"Although the party seeking relief must show 
at least presumptively that he has a defense, the 
requirement of a meritorious case does not neces-
sitate an absolute guarantee of victory or a con-
clusive showing of sufficient cause of action or 
defense. It is enough to present facts from which 
it can be ascertained that the complaining party 
has a sufficiently meritorious claim to entitle 
hi1n to a trial of the issue at a proper adversary 
proceeding; it suffices to establish good faith 
and to tender a seriously litigable issue." 
49 C.J.S., p. 704. 
A 1neritorious defense need not be shown where 
the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction, as where 
defendant was never served: 
Hollywood Gannent Corp. v. Beckennan, Inc., 
143 P. (2d) 738, 61 Cal. App. (2d) 658; 
Leek v. Wieand, 71 Atl. (2d) 911, 7 N.J. Super, 
501; 
Wise v. Herzog, (D.C.) supra; 
Burnett v. Dayton, 252 P. 397, 123 Okla. 156: 
Finch v. Pacific Reduction cf: Ghent. lllfg. Co., 
234 P. 296, 113 Or. 670. 
However, as stated, appellant has a meritorious 
defense to respondents' action and is entitled to prove 
it on a trial of the issues raised by the pleadings. 
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VI. 
THE Sl"T~I~1ARY JrDG~IENT APPEALED 
!1,ROM IS NOT AUTHORIZED BY THE PROVISIONS 
OF RULE 56 lTTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
AND VI:eOATES ITS EXPRESS PROVISIONS. 
A. 
The Summary Judgment Herein Violates The Ex-
press Prorisions Of Rule .56 (c). 
A sUllllnary judgtnent is not authorized under this 
Rule upon the record before the court, even though the 
lower court ruled as a Inatter of law that appellant's 
cross-cmnplaint "is a 1nere collateral attack on the judg-
ment in Civil Action No. 2388, '' or because the court's 
opinion is that said judgment is not void on its face, 
or because the court's opinion is that appellant's cross-
complaint "does not allege that it is void on its face, but 
is based on fraud" or because the court presun1es that 
appellant is chargeable with laches (Findings and Con-
clu~ions, supra, pp. 32 et seq.). 
Rule 56 (c) provides : 
''The su1mnary judgment shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions and ad-
missions on file, together with affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issne as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law." (En1phasis 
added). 
Of course, the issue joined by the allegations of 
respondents' cornplaint asserting title to the land and 
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asking that it be quieted, and appellant's ans,Yer deny-
ing those allegations and clain1ing title in himself and 
praying that the same be quieted as against the claim 
of respondents, is a genuine issue as to material facts. 
Neither the complaint nor the answer says anything 
about a fonner judgment. (See: Respondents' Answer 
to Appelant's Amended Answer). 
The issue of respondents' claim of title by adverse 
possession is a genuine issue as to material facts. 
The issue of fraud raised in appellant's cross-com-
plaint attacking the default judgment entered against 
him in Action No. 2388 is a genuine issue as to material 
facts; as also is the issue of alleged laches on the part 
of appellant. 
All issues presented by the pleadings relate to the 
plea that the judgment attacked is res adjudicata. 
The rule says that the record must show "that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law." 
The question is: Does this rule authorize a trial 
court on these equivocal and conflicting grounds to 
render a summary judgment in disregard of genuine 
issues as to material facts joined by the pleadings f 
Or rnust the trial court try those issues and make its 
findings and decree with respect thereto after a trial 
thereof, regardless of his opinions on disputed questions 
of law~ Is not a litigant entitled to a trial of all genuine 
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issues joined involving 1naterial facts relating thereto 
in the lower court, or u1ust he submit to, or be required 
to appeal frmn, a sununary judginent against him dis-
posing of the case, not on its Inerits, but because of a 
trial judge's opinion or impression, always subject to 
change, as in this case, that the issues of fact are imina.te-
rial with reference to a disputed legal question all related 
to a plea of res adjudicata~ 
If such is the n1eaning of Rule 56 (c) then it is con-
ceivable that in a case such as this, the trial court n1ay 
hold that the cross-complaint attacks a forn1er judgment 
on the ground of fraud, and admitting the fraud it is a 
collateral attack nevertheless and, therefore, all issues 
of fact joined involving the merits of the case will be 
disregarded and a 1notion for suminary judginent grant-
ed. If on appeal that ruling is reversed and the case 
remanded for trial, another motion 1nay be 1nade and 
granted for summary judgment on the ground that the 
cross-complaint is barred by Ru1e 60 (b), from which 
judgment another appeal is taken, resulting in its re-
versal ; then as the third trial begins another motion 
for sumn1ary judgment is made on the ground that the 
cross-cmnplaint does not attack the alleged void judg-
ment on the ground that it is void on its face and, there-
fore, the motion is granted, and a third appeal is taken, 
resulting in a reversal. Then, at the beginning of the 
trial after the third appeal a n1otion is 1nade for sum-
mary judginent on the ground that the forn1er judgment 
attacked is not void on its face and, therefore, it is res 
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adjudicata, frmn which judgment a further appeal ii' 
taken, resulting in another reversal. Then when the 
the fifth trial begins a motion for summary judgment 
is granted on the ground that the cross-complainant is 
chargeable with laches in attacking the former judgment, 
etc., etc., all in disregard of genuine issues of fact raised 
by the cmnplaint and answer and by the cross-complaint 
and answer thereto. This exaggeration is indulged in to 
illustrate our position that Rule 56 (c) cannot con-
ceivably mean and does not say that a motion for sum-
mary judgment may be granted and judgment entered 
thereon because a trial court may believe that the moving 
party Inay be entitled to such judgment on a disputed 
question of law when there are genuine issues of fact 
joined relating thereto and to the ultimate determina-
tion of the rights of the respective parties to the proper-
ty involved. 
There must be •·no genuine issue of fact" found if 
the moving party is entitled to a summary judgment 
as a matter of law. Where the pleadings disclose an 
issue of fact relating to a plea of res adjudicata, the 
parties should be afforded an opportunity to present 
their proof, and the plea should not be determined on 
a motion to dismiss. 
Cutler v. llfetcalfe, 49 N.Y.S. (2d) 438, 28 App. 
Div. 823. 
B. 
The Object of Ru.Ze 56 (c) And Of A Summary 
Judgment Generally Is Not To Create A Nen· Right In 
Favor Of A Party Nor To Substitute A New llf ethod 
Of Trial. 
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The reutedy of suum1a.ry judgntent is in derogation 
of the cmnn1on law and exists only under authority of 
statute. 
'"* * * An exa.ntination of the so-called suin-
Inary judg·1nent laws, both in England and in this 
country, shows that the purpose of such law~ 
was to regulate procedure, and not to create a 
new right in favor of a party plaintiff. They 
were adopted to grant relief against procedural 
tactics interposed for delay and not to s~tbstitute 
a neu· method of trial, where an iss1le of fact 
exists." (E1nphasis added). 
Fisher v. Sun Underwriters Ins. Co. of N.Y., 
179 A. 70:2, 704, 705, 55 R.I. 175, 103 A.L.R. 
1097. 
The test is whether the record in this case discloses 
triable issues of fact warranting a trial: 
Cou·an Oil dl; Refining Co. v. Miller Petroleum 
Corp., 295 P. 504, 112 Cal. App. Supp. 773. 
"The power given to grant a sum1nary judg-
rnent Inust be exercised with care, and not be ex-
tended beyond its just limits, and before a party 
is entitled to the benefits of such a statutory 
remedy he should bring himself squarely within 
the spirit and letter of the statute * * *." 
49 c .. J.s., p. 386. 
See: Prirensal v. Privensal, 67 N.E. 2d 580, 
295 K.Y. 357: 
Gardner v. Shreve, 202 P. 2d 322, 89 Cal. App. 
2d 804. 
Statutes authorizing ~u1nn1ary judgments "do not 
provide a new 1nethod for the consideration and deter-
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mination by the court of questions of law in advance 
of a trial on the facts contrary to established practice, 
or provide a substitute for existing methods in the de-
termination of issues of fact." 
49 Corpus Juris Sec., p. 387, citing: 
Minuto v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 179 A. 
713, 55 R.I. 201 ; 
Fisher v. Sun Underwriters Ins. Co., supra; 
Walsh v. Walsh, 116 P. 2d 62, 18 Cal. 2d 439; 
Gibson v. De La Salle Institute, 152 P. 2d 774, 
66 Cal. A pp. 2d 609 ; 
Tamblyn v. City & County of Denver, 194 P. 
2d 299, 118 Colo. 191; 
D. E. Sanford Co. of S. F. v. Cory Glas3 
Coffee Brewer Co., 194 P. 2d 127, 85 Cal. 
App. 2d 724. 
Any doubt should be resolved against the right to 
summary judgment: 
Gibson v. De La Salle Institute, 152 P. 2d 774, 
66 Cal. A pp. 2d 609 : 
Hatfield v. Barnes (Colo.), 168 P. 2d 552. 
"The statutes generally limit summary pro-
cedure to simple cases, where the moving party's 
right to judgment is clear and free from doubt.'' 
49 Corpus Juris Sec. p. 388, notes 25 and 26. 
See: Breech v. Piramide, 72 A. 2d 339, 4 N.J. 
215; 
Tromblyn v. City & County of Denver, supra. 
It is to be observed that in their answer to appel-
lant's final cross-complaint, respondents admit and plead 
the former judg1nent in paragraph 2 of their "Fourth 
Defense'' pg. 2 and 3: 
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.. Cross-defendants adn1it that they clailu title 
ru1d ownership interests in said land under and 
by virtue of said default judgment referred to in 
the allegation of Paragraph 2 of said cross-emu-
plaint, but deny that cross-defendants' title and 
ozcnership interests in sa.id land rest solely ,npon 
said default judgment * * ·" and * * * allege that 
their ozt·nership and possession are based upon 
other meritorious rights and claims." 
(Answer to cross-cmnplaint amending and 
replacing third runended cross-con1plaint (pg. 
2-3, supra pg. 26). 
If thi ~ is so, wherein lies the utter and extre1ue urgency 
for disposing of appellant's ownership sunnnarily with-
out an opportunity to prove or disprove these issuable 
allegations~ 
In the case at bar respondents' n1otion was based 
on the judgnwnt roll in Case X o. 2388, which record 
\\·as subject to attac.k for the nmnerous sound reasons set 
forth in appellant's pleadings and which respondents' 
motion for su1mnary judgn1ent leaves uncontradicted. 
"The test of a motion for smnn1ary judgtnent 
is whether the pleadings, affidavits, and exhibits 
in support of the motion are sufficient to over-
(·ome the opposing papers, and to justify a finding 
as a n1atter of law that there is no defense to 
the action." 
Sfl(yrestant Credit U11ioll v. Jifrs. Trust Co., 
267 N.Y.S. 302, 305, 239 App. Div. 187. 
·'The questions to be decided are whether the 
facts set forth sufficiently show all that the case 
will involve on a trial, and whether the evidence, 
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including the pleadings and exhibits, clearly dem 
onstrates that the movants are entitled to judg 
ment in their favor." 
49 C.J.S., p. 429, citing: 
Bun Oil Co. v. Blevins, D.C., La., 29 F. Supp 
901, affirmed C.C.A.; 
Blevins v. Bun Oil Co., 110 F. (2d) 566: 
Straus v. Straus, 203 P. (2d) 857, 90 Cal. App 
(2d) 757; 
U.S. Fidelity & Gty. Co. v. Sullivan, 209 P 
(2d) 429, 93 Cal. App. (2d) 559. 
"Where an action has been submitted to the 
court on a motion for summary judgment only~ 
and has not been assigned for hearing on the 
merits, it is error for the court to dispose of the 
case on the merits after it appears that a deci-
sion necessarily involves the determination of a 
controverted issue of fact." 
See: Eston v. Robert Brown, Ltd., 282 N.\Y. 
895, 287 Mich. 44. 
Where the motion for summary judgn1ent is made 
by plaintiff, he is required to sustain the burden by 
submitting convincing proof that there is no real defense 
or issue to be tried, something respondents on the record 
in this case cannot possibly do for the reasons herein 
noted. 
The genuine issues involving material facts in thi~ 
case that cannot be properly disposed of by summar~· 
judgment include (1) the issue of fraud, affecting the 
validity of the default judgment in Civil Action No 
2388; (2) the issue of respondents' claim of title b~ 
adverse possession tmder the color of title of saic 
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default judgment, or under the invalid tax deed; ( 3) and 
the issue of whether appellant is guilty of laches in 
attacking sajd judgment after being inforn1ed of its 
existence. 
The trial court was not authorized by nwtion to 
resolve these Inaterial issues of fact without a trial, nor 
to try these issues, but only detern1ine whether there was 
an issue to be tried. ( ±9 Corpus Juris Sec., Sec. 220, 
p. 39±, :Notes 81-85). There being a material issue of 
fact to be tried, the trial court had no power to grant 
respondents' motion, appellant being entitled to have 
said motion denied as a matter of right. 
Louis S. Kaplan etc. v. Catlett, 1 A. (2d) 884, 
121 X.J. Law 201; 
Utah v. Dickenion, 82 N.Y.S. (2d) 356. 
Since appellant alleges facts which, if proved, con-
stitute a good defense to respondents' action, respond-
ents' motion should not have been granted, even if the 
court doubted the defense. 
Grueninger v. Livingstone, 202 P .. (2d) 785, 
90 Cal. App. (2d) 266. 
"'.An answered case that presents actually 
disputed and complicated facts subject to differ-
ent interpretation, or absolute questions of law, 
should proceed to an orderly and authoritative 
determination of the facts by trial and should not 
be smnmarily determined on 1notion for summary 
judgment, even though what appears to be ques-
tion of fact may ultimately resolve itself into 
a question of law." 
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49 Corpus Juris Sec., p. 397, Note 92, citing 
Minu.to v. ll.fetropolitan Life Ins. Co., 179 A 
713, 55 R.I. 201. 
c. 
The Summary Judgment Herein Invalidates Th1 
Grounds Gil;en To Support It. 
The record disclosing triable issues as to materia 
facts Blust be resolved in favor of appellant on respond 
ents' motion for suinmary judgment. The grounds giver 
by the trial court for its judgment are contradicted anc 
invalidated by the presumption that appellant's plead-
ings are true. Being true, the former default judgmen1 
is void on its face, as well as a fraud upon the court 
and cannot be res adjudicata of any issue in this casE 
or otherwise entitle respondents to object to a trial i.IJ 
which to prove or disprove the issues raised by thei1 
pleadings. 
Respondents' nwtion searched the record and admit-
ted every material avern1ent in appellant's answers and 
cross-cmnplaints, and did not challenge the sufficiency 
or the truth of the facts therein alleged. 
"b1ara v. C.S., D.C., N.Y. 54 F. (2d) 397: 
Grady v. Eashley, 114 P. (2d) 635, 45 Cal. 
App. (2d) 632; 
Pagano v. Anz~tein, 55 N.E. (2d) 181, 29:! 
N.Y. 326. 
In consequence thereof, respondents' cause of action 
was negated and appellant's defense was confirmed. 
No finding of fact could be Blade adversely to appellant 
inasmuch as the facts were resolved by the motion in 
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"' favor of appellant, whic.h the trial court's "'Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of La,v" and Summary J udgn1ent 
ignore. 
,-. 
~-. 
Testing the fac.ts alleged in appellant's answer and 
cross-complaint by its leading and fundamental allega-
tions (Wrathall v. Johnson, 40 P. (2d) 755, 86 Utah 50), 
together with all fair and reasonable inferenc.es to be 
dra\\-11 therefrmn (Bracklein v. Realty Ins. Co., SO P. 
(2d) ±71, 95 rtah 490, 506), it is clear that those plead-
ings and the rec.ord plac.e in issue ( 1) the question of 
respondents' adverse possession under c.olor of an in-
valid tax title, whic.h c.ould not give them title as they 
could not have been in possession while appellant was 
in actual as well as constructive possession, and, if in 
possession, they could not have acquired title as against 
appellant's record ownership for over thirty years by 
alleged possession for a time less than is required to 
acquire title by adverse possession as against appellant 
owner; ( 2) and the rec.ord and pleadings place in issue 
the judgment roll in the prior action, which is void on 
its face because it is not in conformanc.e with statute; 
( 3) and is a fraud upon the court under the admitted 
facts presmned by the motion; ( 4) which judgment 
appellant attacked within a reasonable time after dis-
eovery of the existence of said judgment and the fraud 
by which it \vas procured. 
The foregoing disputed facts, when fortified by the 
indisputable presmnption of their verity, makes the 
judgment of the trial court out as a monstrous error; 
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and, when combined . with an adverse construction o 
respondents' pleadings, as the law requires, it .become: 
more than ever apparent as to just how appellant wa: 
misled by respondents' equivocal allegations of owner 
ship. So construing respondents' pleadings, respond 
ents should be estopped on elementary equity principle: 
from contesting appellant's right to properly defen( 
against diverse claims of title to appellant's propert) 
which chiefly consists of an attempt, thus far successful 
to prevent appellant from defending his title and own. 
ership of his property; just as he was prevented fron 
defending his property against the perfunctory rendi· 
tion of the default decree without jurisdiction in tlu 
earlier proceeding. 
Respondents adn1it the untruth of their own alle· 
gations, so they have no title unless the former defaul1 
judgment is res adjudicata, which it cannot be if th~ 
facts plead by appellant are adn1ittedly true. The re· 
suiting judgment is therefore a self contradiction. 
Harman v. Yeager, 110 P. (2d) 352, 100 Utal 
30; 
Consolidated Steelcraft v. Knowlton, 199 P 
(2d) 149, Utah; 
J.lfooney v. Phillips Pet. Co., 206 P. (2d) 977 
201 Okla. 426; 
Doyle v. Doyle, 89 P. (2d) 305, 184 Okla. 572 
First Nat'l. Bank v. Conway Road Estate 
C.C.A. (Mo.), 94 F. (2d) 736, certiorar 
denied 58 S. Ct. 1047, 304 F.S. 578, ~~ L 
Ed. 1541. 
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In concluding this Point, appellant inquires: How 
could respondents and appellant each be the owners in 
actual and constructive possession of the property in-
volved at the san1e time ·1 How could the adinitted facts, 
which impeach the prior default judgment and prove it 
to be void and a fraud upon the court justify the trial 
court's conclusion that these facts, if true, do not invali-
date the prior judg1nent but adversely conclude the very 
issues to which they fayorably relate 1 
VII. 
THE DEFAULT JUDG~IEN"T IN ACTION NO. 
:2388 AND THE SVJ\LMARY JUDGJ\IENT HEREIN 
BASED THEREON DENIES .APPELLANT HIS 
COXSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF 
LA,V. 
It is not appellant's position that the Utah Statute 
is unconstitutional. Appellant's position is that its pro-
visions for due process of law were not complied with. 
Appellant has shown under the preceding Points 
herein and appellant's Statement of Facts the manner 
in which he was deprived of his property without due 
process of law as provided by the Utah Statute in Action 
X o. 2388, and those facts should require no restatement 
or re-argument here. Suffice it to point out that if, on 
summary judgment, the· former void decree which con-
tradicts the record herein is held to be res adjudicata, 
or a final determination of title to appellant's property, 
then appellant shall have been deprived of his property 
without due process of law. 
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Naisbett v. Herrick, 290 P. 950, 76 Utah 575. 
In Naisbett v. Herrick, supra, Pac. at p. 953, th 
Court states the law applicable to the record in the cas1 
at bar as follows: 
"If a rnoving party shows (1) that he ha 
not been personally served with process, (2) tha 
he had no actual notice of the pendency of th1 
action in tirne to appeal and make his defense 
(3) that he is injuriously affected by the judg 
ment, and, ( 4) that he has tendered an issue t• 
the merits of the claims of his adversary, the1 
and in such case he has an absolute right to havt 
the judg~nent opened." 
And again on page 953, Pac., the Court observes: 
"In proceedings to open default judgments 
the courts quite generally distinguish betweer 
those judgments where personal service of sum 
mons has been had or personal appearance ha~ 
been made before judgment and those judgmenb 
where there has been rnerely constructive servic~ 
of process." 
As to the ruanner of service of process in the casE 
at bar, the court in Naisbett v. Herrick, supra, 290 Pac. 
at page 954 held : 
"* * * if the manner in which eonstructiv( 
service of process is had is not calculated to giv( 
actual notice to the person served, then ther( 
is no presumption that such person had aetna 
notice, and the burden is cast upon the opposin~ 
party to show actual notice. Due process of la" 
requires that before one can be bound by a judg 
rnent affecting his property right, some procef;: 
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must be served upon him which in some degree 
at last is calculated to give him notice * * *. If 
it be true that appellant was in possession of the 
premises involved in this proceeding at the time 
suit was begun and thereafter respondent may not 
be heard to say that appellant was an unknown 
clailnant of the preinises and thereby secure serv-
ice of process by publication as was done in 
this case ,.. * * ." 
~tatutes providing for constructive service are con-
strued to in1pose on the c01nplainant in an action to 
quiet title the affirn1ative duty to n1ake a bona fide and 
reasonably diligent inquiry to ascertain the names and 
residences of persons claiming or owning an adverse 
interest to thus con1ply with the requirements of due 
process of law. In all cases it must be made reasonably 
probable that the defendant to be charged shall receive 
actual notice as a result of the constructive service: 
Jluchtier v. Pizzu.ette, 48 S. Ct. 259, 276 U.S. 
13, 72 L. Ed. -!-!6, 57 A.L.R. 1230 (reversing 
State Court). 
Su.gg v. Hendrix, C.C.A. ~Iiss. 142 F. (2d) 740; 
Schaaf v. Brown, 200 S.W. (2d) 909, 304 Ky. 
466. 
·'Judgments in rem procured by fraudulent 
1neans or collusion are not, as a general rule, res 
judicata against a direct attack based on such 
grounds and made by a person who did not par-
ticipate in the wrongdoing, and where they are 
rendered without jurisdiction they are wholly 
void and have no binding effect in other litigation 
as a bar or estoppel." 
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50 C.J.S. p. 552; 
Campbell v. Sherley, 76 S.W. 540, 25 Ky. 1 
904; 
34 C.J. p. 1174 Note 22, 23; 
Hamilton Nat. Bank v. American L. & T. Co 
100 N:\V. 202, 72 Neb. 81; 
Schrenkeisen v. Kroll, 85 N.Y.S. 1072. 
"* * * In the absence of personal service o 
a party * * * the judginent has been held vali' 
only as to issues necessarily litigated, not as t 
those which might have been litigated had h 
appeared, and the tendency of modern authorit: 
has been held not to allow decrees in rem an' 
binding effect as estoppels by verdict, except, ~ 
course, where the collateral action is betwee: 
persons who were parties in fact to the proceed 
ings in rem, and contested there the issues sough 
to be re-litigated." (Emphasis added). 
50 C.J.S., p. 552, and cases there cited. 
"Substituted service is due process of la' 
* * * only where there is some reason or necessit; 
therefor, and, where there is no reason why per 
sonal service cannot be had, personal servic~ 
is nec~ssary to constitute due process even as tc 
property within the jurisdiction of the Court.' 
16 C.J.S., pp. 1257-1258 and cases there cited 
Hilton Bros. Motor Co. v. Dist. Court. 10! 
Utah 526, 167 P. (2d) 973; 
D. & R. G. Ry. Co. v. Ind. Accid. Comm., 7• 
Utah 316, 279 P. 612. 
The court in assuming jurisdiction in action numbe 
2388 and rendering the default judgment therein violatec 
the powers conferred upon it hy constitutional and stat 
utory provisions for due process of law. 
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THE JUDGMENT IN ACTION NUMBER 2388 
CANNOT BE RES ADJl~DICATA. 
If the former default judgment is valid then it might 
be res adjudicata as to all n1atters it could be held to 
have concluded without a trial; but if, as appellant 
respectfully insists, it is void on its face, a fraud upon 
the court and appellant and in violation of appellant's 
constitutional rights, it could not be res adjudicata of any 
ISSUe. 
The principle of res adjudicata does not apply where 
the attack upon a judgment showing it is void is made 
in an independent action in equity to set it aside. 
Lake v. Bonynge, 161 Cal. 120; 118 Pac. 535; 
Patterson v. Almond City Land Co., 40 C.A. 
285, 180 Pac. 823. 
\Ve cite the foregoing authorities because of the 
lower court's ruling that the forn1er default judgment 
is res adjudicata. It is clear that in an action against 
a non-resident defendant who has not been personally 
served with process or appeared and litigated any issue 
that a default judgment against him cannot be res 
adjudicata against an attack on the ground that it is 
void. 
CONCLUSION 
The sum and substance of this case and applicable 
law poses one fundamental question: Whether a default 
judgment, void on its face and obtained by fraudulent 
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· methods, by abuse of the processes of the Court an 
fraud upon the Court, in an action to quiet title, can b 
held to sustain another action to quiet title to the sam 
property brought by the same plaintiff against the sam 
defendant because of the questionable validity of th 
former judgment, by holding that such judgment is re 
adjudicata and cannot be attacked. 
We apologize to this Court for what the Court rna: 
well regard as a too lengthy brief with llllnecessar: 
repetitions and citations. Our excuse is that the severa 
points relied upon by respondents and the lower Com' 
to sustain the summary judgment are, at least in par1 
the cause of supererogation in dealing with them. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CULBERT L. OLSON 
(In Pro Per) 
CLYDE S. JOHNSON 
CYRUS G. GATRELL 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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